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THE MEDICAID GAMBLE 
ANN MARIE MARCIARILLE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)1 was an 
unprecedented gamble.  As passed, the ACA transformed Medicaid from an 
unevenly and underfunded program for the poor and disabled to a program to offer 
those priced out of commercial insurance markets government-funded health 
insurance similar to Medicare, the single-payer system for seniors and the disabled.  
In a sense, the ACA gambled that Medicaid could be more like Medicare.   
The ACA, as it was transformed by the Supreme Court of the United States, 
became a gamble on the part of the Court that good things would follow from 
empowering each of the states to individually determine the fate of Medicaid 
expansion in its jurisdiction.  Giving states the option to expand has given each of 
them enormous leverage in their bargaining with the federal executive and 
legislature over what shape their individual version of this jointly-funded state-
federal program will take. 
 The ACA’s Medicaid expansion or non-expansion on the ground, as it is 
being carried out by the states cooperatively or uncooperatively with the federal 
government, is likely to be a third thing.  The country is likely to see all 
possibilities happen at once, in different places.  In some states, Medicaid is likely 
to become much more like Medicare.  In others, Medicaid may change slowly and 
incrementally, if at all.  And, in others, Medicaid may become more like exchange-
mediated commercial insurance. 
 This article will address what these Medicaid gambles are, how these gambles 
are likely to resolve themselves, and whether Medicaid as we know it is likely to 
survive the ACA. 
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 1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
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The thesis of this article is that when we disagree about Medicaid expansion 
under the ACA we are disagreeing about the very purpose and history of Medicaid 
as well as the shape of the program going forward.  We are also engaging in an 
empirical dispute over how much, if any, improvement in health outcomes 
Medicaid produces or may produce for those enrolled in the program.  Finally, we 
are also participating in  a philosophical debate over both what poor people need 
from American society and what we as a society need from poor people in order to 
broaden their access to health insurance and health care. 
I advance my thesis by discussing the ACA’s goals for Medicaid, the partial 
transformation of these goals by the Supreme Court, and remarkable history of fifty 
bespoke versions of Medicaid, now only enhanced by the strong use of Medicaid’s 
1115 waiver process to bring premium supported Medicaid expansion to fruition.2 
 The ACA’s Medicaid expansion is polarizing as a result of its historical 
origins, its multifold purposes, and of empirical conflict over how much 
improvement in health outcomes Medicaid in fact produces for its beneficiaries.  
 Five early Medicaid expansion states plus the District of Columbia have 
placed their big bets on expanding Medicaid to make it more like Medicare.3  These 
jurisdictions will have added over 500,000 Americans to the Medicaid even before 
the broader January 2014 ACA rollout.4  California, for example, is well on the way 
to expanding Medi-Cal5 to cover one out of every four Californians.6  But is there 
the will and the money to see the game through?  California, for example, is also 
offering some of the lowest Medicaid provider reimbursement rates in the country.7  
It is thus guaranteeing that its current shortage of Medicaid primary care services 
providers will likely become even more acute.8  Medicare’s success as a single-
payer system is based on its willingness to (so far) offer reimbursement rates that 
 
2. See infra Parts II–IV (describing issues related to the ACA’s purpose with regards to 
Medicaid, the effects of recent Supreme Court decisions, and the historical and present condition 
of Medicaid with regards to the fifty states). 
3. See States Getting a Jump Start on Health Reform’s Medicaid Expansion, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 2, 2012), http://kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/states-getting-a-jump-
start-on-health/ (noting that California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Minnesota, New 
Jersey, and Washington have already taken steps to expand Medicaid to low-income adults). 
4. Id. 
5. Medi-Cal or MediCal is California’s version of Medicaid.  Medi-Cal Eligibility and 
Covered California - Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVS. (last modified 
Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/medi-cal/eligibility/Pages/Medi-CalFAQs 
2014a.aspx#1.   
6. Id.; see also LAUREL LUCIA et al., U.C. BERKELEY LABOR CTR. & UCLA CTR. FOR 
HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, MEDI-CAL EXPANSION UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 7 (Jan. 
2013), available at http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/healthcare/medi-cal_expansion13.pdf. 
7. See CAL. BUDGET PROJECT, EXPANDING HORIZONS: KEY FACTS ABOUT THE MEDI-CAL 
PROGRAM AS CALIFORNIA IMPLEMENTS HEALTH CARE REFORM  7 (2013), available at 
http://cbp.org/pdfs/2013/130402_Expanding_Horizons.pdf (describing the increase in spending 
per enrollee and doctor reimbursement rates as among the lowest in the US). 
8. See id. at 50–51 (showing California to have the second lowest percentage of office-
based physicians accepting new Medicaid patients in the country, at 57.1%, compared to the 
national average of 69.4%). 
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the overwhelming majority of doctors regard as acceptable.9  Yet California 
continues to vociferously litigate its right to lower Medicaid far below Medicare-
rate reimbursement in the future.10   This article considers whether this is consistent 
with carrying out the original Medicaid expansion goals of the ACA. 
 As of October 23, 2013, twenty-five states appear poised to begin their 
Medicaid expansion according to the original legislatively-intended terms of the 
ACA on January 1, 2014.11  But twenty-five other states are not.  Four of the states 
that are expanding, led by Arkansas,12 are attempting right now to strike deals with 
the Obama administration to make their Medicaid expansion move to exchange-
mediated commercial insurance rather than single-payer Medicare.13  The 
 
9. See Dan Diamond, More Doctors Are Quitting Medicare. Is Obamacare Really to 
Blame?, CAL. HEALTHLINE (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.californiahealthline.org/road-to-
reform/2013/more-doctors-are-quitting-medicare-is-obamacare-really-to-blame (noting the 
growing number of physicians accepting Medicare patients and the fact that the program 
represents a significant percentage of patients for American Academy of Family Physician 
members). 
10. See, e.g., Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) 
(discussing the suit brought by health care providers challenging the reduction in Medicaid 
reimbursement and California’s defense that it has a right to reduce payments). 
11. As of this writing, the following states are moving forward with Medicaid expansion at 
this time: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of 
Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia.  See The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in 
States That Do Not Expand, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. fig.1 (Oct. 23, 2013), http://kff.org/health-
reform/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-
medicaid/ [hereinafter The Coverage Gap].  Of those, Arkansas, Iowa, and Michigan are exploring 
an approach to expansion likely to require waiver approval.  Id.  Tennessee is also exploring an 
approach to Medicaid expansion likely to require waiver approval, although it is not moving 
forward at this time.  Id.  New Hampshire has called a special session to discuss expansion.  Id.  It 
is also worth noting that state ACA Medicaid expansion or non-expansion is in a constant state of 
flux.  See Nicole Huberfeld, Federal-State Tensions in Fulfilling the ACA’s Promises, CONST. 
DAILY (Oct. 6, 2013), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2013/10/federal-state-tensions-in-
fulfilling-the-acas-promises/ (noting that “[i]n almost every state reported as ‘leaning toward not 
participating,’ and in many states reported as ‘not participating,’ some significant act has occurred 
to explore implementation of the Medicaid expansion”). 
12. As of October 23, 2013, Indiana, Iowa, and Oklahoma were considering following 
Arkansas’s lead to participate in Medicaid expansion through an alternate expansion model.  See 
id.  Arkansas’s model was approved by the federal government.  See ROBERT PEAR, One State’s 
Way to Bolster Health Coverage for the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 27, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/news/affordable-care-act/2013/09/27/one-states-way-to-boost-health-
coverage-for-poor/?_r=0 [hereinafter Bolster Health Coverage for the Poor]. Likewise, Iowa’s 
plan was granted conditional approval. See State Market Profiles: Iowa, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 
(Nov. 18, 2013), http://kff.org/health-reform/state-profile/state-exchange-profiles-iowa/. 
Michigan’s plan has been submitted for approval.  See Michigan Asks Feds for Medicaid 
Expansion Approval, NBC 25 (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.minbcnews.com/news/story.aspx?id= 
969067#.Uo-JwfksntI. Tennessee continues to consider the issue.  See RICK LYMAN, Tennessee 
Governor Hesitates on Medicaid Expansion, Frustrating Many, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/17/us/politics/tennessee-governor-hesitates-on-medicaid-
expansion-frustrating-many.html.  
13. On September 27, 2013, the Arkansas waiver application popularly referred to as the 
private option for Medicaid expansion was approved by the federal government.  See Bolster 
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remaining states are—for now—turning down the $5,000 annual payout per 
additional beneficiary that the federal government is offering, either in the hope 
that resistance will bring down the ACA, the fear that their state finances will be 
unable to carry the long-run burden of Medicaid expansion, or in the expectation 
that holdouts will get better terms as the Obama administration and Democratic 
legislators find keeping federal commitments low is less urgent than reducing the 
numbers of the uninsured. 
 The majority in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, led 
by Chief Justice Roberts, found the ACA Medicaid expansion as written to be 
unduly coercive and thus turned what Congress passed and the president signed 
from one Medicaid gamble into at least four, and perhaps as many as fifty-one 
gambles.14    
The first Medicaid gamble was the one the legislative majorities that passed 
the ACA intended to make: that it would be possible, and a good thing, to make 
Medicaid more like Medicare.15  That gamble is going forward in the early-adopter 
states, including Arizona, Colorado, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and 
Washington.16  Overlaid on top of it is a second Medicaid gamble: the gamble that 
states like California are taking, in that Medicaid can be turned into something like 
Medicare without raising provider reimbursement rates to something like Medicare 
levels.17  Additionally, there is a third Medicaid gamble: a gamble that previous 
Supreme Court worries about federal coercion of states did not raise the possibility 
that the Court might disallow nationwide Medicaid expansion,18 and that insurance 
against such an activist Court should be acquired via a fallback mechanism. 
 The fourth Medicaid gamble was that of United States Supreme Court Chief 
Justice John Roberts: that bending the arc of history away from long-run 
government expansion is best accomplished not by risking the Supreme Court’s 
moral authority via a declaration that the ACA’s individual mandate was 
unconstitutional, but rather by putting the Court’s thumb on the scales so that states 
could bargain with the federal government about how, and when, and if, the ACA 
 
Health Coverage for the Poor, supra note 12 (describing the approved program).  
14. See infra Part II (describing the series of gambles associated with Medicaid expansion in 
light of the National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius decision). 
15. See infra Part IV.A (describing the push to make Medicaid more like Medicare). 
16. See Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, as of October 22, 2013, 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 22, 2013), http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-
around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/ (describing the current status 
regarding early adoption of Medicaid expansion in the states). 
17. See Phil Galewitz, Few Medicaid Docs Have Seen 2013 Pay Raise, KAISER HEALTH 
NEWS (July 16, 2013), http://capsules.kaiserhealthnews.org/index.php/2013/07/few-medicaid-
docs-have-seen-2013-pay-raise/ (detailing how California’s reimbursement rates have not risen 
with the expansion of Medicaid). 
18. See MARYBETH MUSUMECI, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., A GUIDE TO THE SUPREME 
COURT’S DECISION ON THE ACA’S MEDICAID EXPANSION (2012), available at 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8347.pdf (showing the complex 
patchwork of concerns that the Supreme Court had regarding Medicaid expansion). 
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were to be implemented.19  The fifth Medicaid gamble was subordinate to the third: 
the apparent gamble of Justices Kagan and Breyer that a functional judicial 
rewriting-on-the-fly of the ACA statute would not break the mechanism.20 
 And then there are the various state level Medicaid gambles: Arkansas’s and 
other states’ gambles that Medicaid can be made more like commercial insurance 
without busting their state budgets, or at least that the federal government will hold 
states harmless if they pursue high-cost Medicaid expansion paths;21 other states 
gamble that their hospitals, doctors, and citizens can flourish without Medicaid 
expansion;22 and still other states gamble that by delaying Medicaid expansion they 
can negotiate better terms for themselves—á la Nebraska’s “cornhusker 
kickback”23—from the federal government when and if they do expand.24 
 The purpose of this article is to build a framework for understanding the 
complex evolution of Medicaid going forward. 
 
 
 
 
 
19. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (explaining that 
the Medicaid expansion aspect of the ACA is unconstitutional because it tells the States how to 
regulate and that Congress can give grants and incentives to gain state acceptance but the State 
must have a choice in the matter). 
20. See id. at 2607 (explaining that, despite the characterization of the joint dissent, by 
withdrawing Medicaid funds from States that do not comply with the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, 
the Court is not rewriting the statute, but simply enforcing the Constitution). 
21. See Sarah Kliff, Arkansas Is Using This Weird Trick To Expand Medicaid, WASH. POST 
WONKBLOG (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/ wp/2013/09/27/ 
arkansas-is-using-this-weird-trick-to-expand-medicaid (explaining that CMS approved an 
Arkansas Medicaid expansion plan that allowed qualified recipients to purchase private health 
insurance, with Medicaid paying the bill); U.S. Clears Arkansas Medicaid Expansion Proposal, 
REUTERS (Sept. 27, 2013, 1:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/ 09/27/us-usa-medicaid-
arkansas-idUSBRE98Q0WM20130927 (explaining that Iowa and Pennsylvania, like Arkansas, 
have also been looking for ways to modify Medicaid expansion). 
22. See, e.g., Missouri Senate Panel Rejects Medicaid Expansion, KANSAS CITY STAR, Nov. 
14, 2013, http://www.kansascity.com/2013/11/14/4620782/missouri-senate-panel-rejects.html 
(explaining that a Missouri Senate committee rejected Medicaid expansion because flaws in the 
current Medicaid system left the committee feeling uneasy about expanding the program). 
23. See Jordan Fabian, Obama Healthcare Plan Nixes Ben Nelson’s ‘Cornhusker Kickback’ 
Deal, THE HILL (Feb. 22, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/ 
82621-obama-healthcare-plan-nixes-ben-nelsons-cornhusker-kickback-deal (explaining that an 
earlier version of the ACA included one hundred million dollars in Medicaid funding earmarked 
for Nebraska to win Nebraska Senator Nelson’s support for the ACA, an earmark which was 
ultimately excluded from the legislation). 
24. See J. Lester Feder & Jason Millman, Medicaid Ruling Could Give Red States More 
Bargaining Power, POLITICO (June 29, 2012, 5:08 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/ 
stories/0612/78040.html (explaining that despite being able to opt out of Medicaid expansion, 
many states will not, knowing that they can use President Obama's desire to have all states 
participating to their advantage in getting concessions from the government in exchange for their 
cooperation). 
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II.  THE ACA’S MEDICAID GAMBLES 
 In the aftermath of the National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius holding,25 legal scholars and policymakers focused their attention on the 
Supreme Court’s decision that the individual mandate provisions and 
accompanying insurance market reforms could survive as a tax.26  Less attention 
was paid to the Supreme Court’s bold decision to rein in the authority of the 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) to 
enforce the states’ compliance with the amended Medicaid statute by conditioning 
receipt of any federal funds for Medicaid on state participation in the amended 
Medicaid program.  Yet that bold decision may well, in retrospect, be seen as the 
most important part of the National Federation decision, for it was what turned 
what had been one single Medicaid Gamble into many. 
A. The ACA’s Original Medicaid Gamble: Making the ACA More Like Medicare 
 The intent of the legislative majorities that passed the ACA was to undertake 
a gigantic Medicaid Gamble.27  They gambled that Medicaid could be transformed 
from an unevenly funded and underfunded program for the poor and disabled, to a 
program offering those priced out of commercial insurance markets government-
funded health insurance similar to Medicare, the single-payer system for seniors 
and the disabled.28 
 
25. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (holding that the 
individual mandate, while not a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause, is within Congress’ 
taxing power). 
26. See David B. Rivkin, Jr. et al., NFIB v. Sebelius and the Triumph of Fig-Leaf 
Federalism, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 31, 45 –56 (2012) (exploring counter-arguments to the Court's 
holding that the individual mandate could be upheld as a tax); see also Timothy Jost, The Supreme 
Court On The Individual Mandate's Constitutionality: An Overview, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 
28, 2012, 2:36 PM), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/06/28/the-supreme-court-on-the-individual-
mandates-constitutionality-an-overview (explaining that past courts rejected the tax argument, but 
that the government kept pressing it and the tax argument ultimately won favor in the Court).  
27. See Robert Pear & David M. Herszenhorn, Finance Panel Wraps Up Its Work on Health 
Care Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2009, at A16 (explaining that lawmakers in Washington, D.C. hope 
that the cost of Medicaid expansion will not exceed $900 billion over ten years because, if it does, 
Senator Max Baucus notes that “we have got a problem.”).  
28. See Diane Rowland & Barbara Lyons, Medicare, Medicaid, and the Elderly Poor, 18 
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 61, 61, 65 (1996) (explaining that Medicaid complements Medicare in 
assisting low-income Medicare beneficiaries pay their Medicare premiums and that the large 
volume of poor “relying solely on Medicare for coverage underscores the limits of Medicaid's 
reach.”); Robert J. Master & Carol Taniguchi, Medicare, Medicaid, and People With Disability, 
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 91, 96 (1996) (explaining that from the early stages of the program, 
Medicaid has been essential to providing people with disabilities access to health services); 
Juliette Forstenzer Espinosa, Reimagining Federal and State Roles for Health Reform Under the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, ACADEMY HEALTH 4 (2010), 
http://www.academyhealth.org/files/publications/ResInsights ReformRoles.pdf (explaining that 
under the ACA states are required to create health insurance exchanges, which give an opportunity 
to those with little to no consumer insurance choices the ability to obtain higher coverage at lower 
prices). 
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B. The Absence of Fallback Mechanisms 
 The ACA’s drafters included a fallback provision in case of state non-
acceptance of the federal invitation to set up state-based health exchanges,29 but 
there are no fallback provisions for the Medicaid expansion.  The fallback for 
exchanges is that there will be a federally-facilitated exchange for each non-
exchange-building state.30  In retrospect, the failure to include an equivalent 
fallback provision for the Medicaid expansion was yet another tremendous 
Medicaid gamble.  The lack of a fallback option for Medicaid expansion 
contributes to our current impasse, as any state that prefers not to be all in on 
Medicaid expansion as outlined in the ACA must find its own way through the 
cumbersome 1115 process31 to broker a compromise, losing precious federal 
Medicaid super-match dollars as well as expanded coverage for its citizens in the 
interim.32    
 The Supreme Court’s holding in National Federation, that Congress could not 
force the states to extend Medicaid coverage under the ACA as a pre-condition for 
funding continuing Medicaid participation, was yet a third immense Medicaid 
gamble.33  As Justice Ginsburg noted, Congress could have repealed the Medicaid 
Act entirely, replaced it with a new, renamed program identical in substance to the 
Medicaid statute as amended by the ACA, and left the states free to join or not.34  
Because Congress did not do that, the Court held that it was unduly coercive for 
Congress to condition funding for the entire program on compliance with the 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion.35  The Court thus created a core program that might be 
 
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (providing action to be taken if a State 
either is not an electing State, or if the Secretary determines that the required exchange will not be 
operational by January 1, 2014, or if the State hasn't taken other actions necessary to meet the 
standards set out in the ACA). 
30. See id. (providing that if a State fails to establish the required exchange, the Secretary 
will establish and operate such an exchange within the State). 
31. See Five Key Questions and Answers About Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration 
Waivers, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 3 (June 2011), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files. 
wordpress.com/2013/01/8196.pdf [hereinafter Five Key Questions and Answers] (explaining the 
process for getting a Section 1115 waiver approved, including discussions which take place before 
even having an application, obtaining an application for a waiver, CMS reviewing the waiver, 
notice and comment procedures, and then significant negotiation between states and HHS to get 
the waiver approved, with timelines varying significantly for this process). 
32. See Ed Kilgore, New Republic: Court Curtails Medicaid Expansion, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(June 29, 2012, 9:20 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/06/29/155974499/new-republic-court-
curtails-medicaid-expansion (describing the federal money being offered in Medicaid expansion 
as a “super-match”); see also Five Key Questions and Answers, supra note 31 (explaining that the 
length of time it takes to get approval for a 1115 waiver varies significantly). 
33. Nat’l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (“[w]hat Congress is 
not free to do is to penalize States that choose not to participate in that new program by taking 
away their existing Medicaid funding”). 
34. See id. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“Congress could have recalled the existing 
legislation, and replaced it with a new law making Medicaid as embracive of the poor as Congress 
chose.”). 
35. See id. at 2604–05 (majority opinion) (explaining that conditioning Medicaid funding on 
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described as “pre-ACA Medicaid”.  Pre-ACA Medicaid bears very little 
resemblance to the original iteration of Medicaid.36   The Court thus created an 
optional secondary extender, henceforth labeled “ACA Medicaid Expansion”.  The 
Court gave each state the option to decide whether to continue to participate in the 
former program of pre-ACA Medicaid and, separately, whether to participate in the 
latter program of the ACA Medicaid expansion.37  
C. A Word About Exchanges 
 As of July 2013, sixteen states and the District of Columbia intend to operate 
state exchanges.38  Twenty-seven will have federally facilitated exchanges39 as of 
January 1, 2014.40  Seven states chose hybrid models,41 leaving the federal 
government—in whole or in part—responsible for the establishment and operation 
of thirty-four exchanges on January 1, 2014.42  This is far more active a role in the 
exchanges than the federal government contemplated playing.43  
 The implications of the federal government operating federally facilitated 
exchanges under an insurance purchasing scheme designed for state-guided entry 
into the state-regulated insurance marketplace adds layers of complexity and 
political sensitivity to the task.44  The challenges, in short, are operational and 
 
acceptance of ACA Medicaid expansion is “a gun to the head” and “economic dragooning that 
leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.”).  
36. See LAURA KATZ OLSON, THE POLITICS OF MEDICAID 26, 74–75 (2010). 
37. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2608 (“States may now choose 
to reject the expansion… [o]ther States, however, may voluntarily sign up, finding the idea of 
expanding Medicaid coverage attractive”). 
38. Tracy Garber & Sara Collins, Update: State Action Round-Up on Affordable Care Act 
Implementation, COMMONWEALTH FUND BLOG (July 19, 2013), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Blog/2013/Jul/State-Action-Roundup-July-19.aspx. 
39. Id.; see also BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ & ANNIE L. MACH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R42663, HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT (ACA) 10 (2013) (defining a federally facilitated exchange as one in which the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) controls and carries out all functions of the 
exchange). 
40. Status of Health Insurance Exchange Implementation, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY 2, 
http://www.cbpp.org/files/CBPP-Analysis-on-the-Status-of-State-Exchange-Implementation.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 19, 2014). 
41. See FERNANDEZ & MACH, supra note 39, at 10 (defining a hybrid model as a 
“partnership” that combines state-designed and operated functions with federally designed and 
operated function, however HHS retains authority over these exchanges). 
42. Id.  
43. 155 CONG. REC. S13558–06, (daily ed. Dec. 20, 2009) (Statement of Senator Max 
Baucus entering into the record, The O’Neill Institute, LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN HEALTH REFORM-
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATES TO PURCHASE HEALTH INSURANCE) (discussing the role 
of the States in the exchanges). 
44. See Sarah Goodell, Health Policy Brief: Federally Facilitated Exchanges, HEALTH AFF. 
3 (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=84 (arguing 
that by allowing states oversight responsibilities, the federal government will have to be cognizant 
of the variety of state laws and regulations in a addition to the new federal regulations). 
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regulatory, as well as political.45  The Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) indicated, for example, that it will rely on state-conducted premium rate 
reviews and network adequacy determinations as part of the health plan 
certification process in federally facilitated exchanges.46  The federal government, 
from one perspective, serves as the handmaiden of the non-expansion state by 
building its exchange on state-specific data and standards.47  States, which have 
traditionally regulated insurance,48 are all-in by proxy here, whether they like it or 
not.49  For some states, of course, this may be a forced proxy.50 
 Post-National Federation, all of the federalism chairs are re-arranged.  Those 
states most opposed to the ACA express it by passive—or in the case of Missouri, 
active51—resistance to the federal-state cooperation inherent in exchange 
building.52  Those states considered most amenable to the federal government’s role 
in health care reform take control of their own state-based exchange development.53 
This is another gamble made and lost: state-operated exchanges leave the federal 
government as the overall reviewer, rather than the implementer, of state exchange 
compliance with the ACA.54  This loss is two-fold.  First, it represents a loss of 
 
45. See Sarah Dash et al., Health Policy Brief: Health Insurance Exchanges and State 
Decisions, HEALTH AFF. 1 (July 18, 2013), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief. 
php?brief_id=96 (noting that this degree of health care reform is unprecedented, thus raising 
unresolved questions like low enrollment and adverse selection). 
46. See Letter from Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Servs., to Issuers on Federally-facilitated & State P’ship Exch. at 6–14 (Apr. 5, 2013), available at 
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/2014_letter_to_ 
issuers_04052013.pdf (stating that CMS will rely on state analyses so long as the state abides by 
the federally set standards and that CMS does not plan to duplicate any state reviews, thus leaving 
the review process to the states). 
47. See id. at 5 (arguing that states will have flexibility to implement health plan exchanges 
based individualized state-reviews, provided the application is consistent with federal standards). 
48. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011–1015 (2006) (stating that states have the 
power to regulate or tax the business of insurance). 
49. See Goodell, supra note 44 at 2–3 (noting that if states decide to opt-out of a pure State-
based exchange, the states will then have federally run programs either in part or in whole). 
50. See Pat Garofalo, GOP Governors Play Politics With Life and Death, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT, OPINION (June 4, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/pat-garofalo/ 
2013/06/04/study-rejecting-obamacare-medicaid-expansion-costs-gop-governors-money (quoting 
Texas Governor Rick Perry’s unambiguous opposition to the ACA). 
51. See MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1186(5) (2012) (prohibiting Missouri state employees from 
aiding ACA enrollment or implementation). 
52..See LINDA J. BLUMBERG & SHANNA RIFKIN, URBAN INST., STATE-LEVEL PROGRESS IN 
IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERALLY FACILITATED EXCHANGES: FINDINGS IN THREE CASE STUDY 
STATES 6 (June 2013), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412844-State-Level-
Progress-in-Implementation-of-Federally-Facilitated-Exchanges.pdf (noting that while Alabama 
has not implemented an exchange, the state has not made explicit statements suggesting 
unwillingness to cooperate with the federal government’s implementation of market reforms). 
53. See MassHealth: Roadmap to 2014, MASS.GOV at 2–3 (May 1, 2013), 
http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/eohhs/cms-waiver/aca-transition-plan-draft.pdf (noting that 
Massachusetts, in particular, has taken the lead on state specific health care reform by dismantling 
part of its signature Commonwealth Care infrastructure to make room for ACA-mandated 
infrastructure that dovetails with expanded Medicaid). 
54. See STAN DORN, URBAN INST., STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL HEALTH 
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time, money, and attention.  Second, it creates the false impression that the federal 
government has come to save the day, particularly in non-expansion states. 
III.  THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S GOALS FOR MEDICAID 
The ACA’s expanded Medicaid has implications for access, stability of enrollment, 
provider reimbursement, and administrative simplification.  Each of these is 
designed to increase ease of access, improve stability of enrollment and continuity 
of care, bolster provider reimbursement, and streamline administration all with the 
goal of simplifying Medicaid’s health insurance system.  
A. Access to Care 
 The second Medicaid gamble surrounds the decision to begin to move 
Medicaid reimbursement as close to Medicare reimbursement as possible.55  
Medicaid reimbursement is set by the participating states with the caveat that the 
reimbursement system implemented not effectively restrict access to providers for 
Medicaid beneficiaries.56  Medicare, though also based on a form of administered 
pricing, has not had its reimbursement scheme subject to the same political vagaries 
as has Medicaid.57   
 The third Medicaid gamble built into the ACA is that Medicaid expansion 
would look more like a step towards Medicare for all, rather than the subsidized 
purchase of commercial insurance.58  Contained within this gamble is the 
understanding that states would embrace Medicaid expansion that offered the 
increased Medicaid population a program increasingly similar to that offered to the 
existing Medicare population. 
 
 
 
REFORM: HARNESSING FEDERAL RESOURCES TO MEET STATE POLICY GOALS 9 (July 2010), 
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412321-State-Implementation-of-National-
Health-Reform.pdf (noting that while states can implement state-based exchanges, all states will 
be held accountable through annual reports reviewed by HHS). 
55. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (Supp. 
IV 2011) (noting that effective January 1, 2013, this section officially raises Medicaid payment 
rates for primary care and immunization service to Medicare rates at the federal expense, but is 
contingent upon state cooperation for the implementation). 
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2006) (stating that reimbursement must be appealing 
to enough health care providers so that the amount of providers is sufficient to those in need of 
services). 
57. See Paul Starr, The Health-Care Legacy of the Great Society, PRINCETON UNIV., 
http://www.princeton.edu/~starr/articles/articles14/Starr_LBJ_HC_Legacy_1-2014.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2014) (discussing how Medicare’s national origins freed it from the political 
process that the state implemented Medicaid system developed). 
58. Margaret Flowers, Beyond The Spin, Some Facts About The Affordable Care Act, AL 
JAZEERA (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/10/beyond-spin-some-
facts-about-affordable-care-act-2013101483653308300.html (suggesting that the ACA moves the 
United States to larger privatization instead of a universal health care system).  
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B. Stability of Enrollment 
 Medicaid enrollment is notoriously unstable as individuals pass in and out of 
Medicaid beneficiary status depending, for the most part, on their ability to verify 
eligibility at the time intervals required of a given state.  Both health insurance 
administrative costs and health care delivery costs are increased when the same 
individuals churn in and out of Medicaid insured status, creating duplication of 
both health care paperwork and health care services. 
 Attempting to capture the savings from eliminating churn, states like 
Arkansas and Oklahoma, instead, have seized upon the Medicaid statutory 
language59 combined with the HHS Rule 435.1015’s language that Medicaid 
expansion funds may be used for the purchase of commercial insurance for newly 
eligible Medicaid beneficiaries so long as the cost is “comparable to the cost of 
providing direct [Medicaid] coverage.”60  The stability of Medicaid expansion in 
these states depends on the definition of “comparable.” 
 It is too soon to tell how Arkansas proposes to meet this standard, while 
providing ACA-defined essential health benefits61 through commercial insurance, 
but the hoped-for substantial savings from eliminating churn62 in enrollment may 
help to foot the bill.   
C. Bolstering Provider Reimbursement 
 More troublingly, Arkansas is considering shifting the cost of part of the 
Medicaid expansion population’s commercial insurance enrollment to those 
presently enrolled in Medicaid.63  Although subject to the ACA’s maintenance of 
 
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7 (2006) (stating that state flexibility in benefit packages sets only 
a benchmark for coverage, including the right to use commercial insurance). 
60. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.1015 (2014) (stating that as long as the state meets the conditions 
provided, the state can use expansion funds to purchase commercial insurance); see also Medicaid 
Proposal by Two Oklahoma GOP Lawmakers Has Some Appeal, But Obamacare Still a Bad Idea, 
NEWSOK (May 6, 2013, 11:35am), http://newsok.com/medicaid-proposal-by-two-oklahoma-gop-
lawmakers-has-some-appeal-but-obamacare-still-a-bad-idea/article/3806070 (stating that a 
commercial insurance program in Oklahoma would cover up to 150,000 citizens and provide 
additional incentives to deter overutilization and abuse). 
61. See Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Admin., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to 
Andy Allison, Dir., Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., (Sept. 27, 2013), available at 
http://posting.arktimes.com/media/pdf/arkansassignedapprovalltr.pdf [hereinafter Letter from 
Marilyn Tavenner] (stating that Arkansas’s private approach to Medicaid expansion has until 
November 2013 to fill in all details regarding the approved waiver application to use federal 
Medicaid expansion dollars to purchase commercial health insurance). 
62. See Smoothing Out Medicaid’s ‘Churn’, WENDELL POTTER (June 10, 2013), 
http://wendellpotter.com/2013/06/smoothing-out-medicaids-churn/ (“It’s called churn because 
most people who are ‘disenrolled’ – to use industry jargon – are eventually reinstated.  Their 
eligibility for Medicaid never changed. They lost coverage solely because of paperwork 
requirements or a slight and fleeting bump in pay because of having to work overtime during a 
given week”). 
63. See Adrianna McIntyre & Karan Chhabra, Arkansas Proposal Still Fiddly in Practice, 
PROJECT MILLENNIAL (Mar. 9, 2013), http://projectmillennial.org/category/arkansas/page/2/ 
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effort provisions,64 considerable leeway has been afforded to non-expansion states 
in interpreting these provisions.65  Maine, for example, reduced original Medicaid 
enrollment by over 40,000 beneficiaries.66 
 Medicare-administered pricing is largely in the control of health care 
providers.67  Conversely, Medicaid-administered pricing is very much in the control 
of state legislators.68  This produces a tremendous variation in Medicaid provider 
reimbursement between and among the states.69  It also produces considerable 
variance in physician Medicaid acceptance.70  Considerable variance also exists 
between physician acceptance of new commercially insured patients and physician 
 
(noting that e-mails sent among Arkansas state leaders proposed making up the state budget 
shortfalls from the Medicaid plan by taking money from those currently in Medicaid and giving it 
to those within the Medicaid/insurance expansion through the addition of copays, shifting 
enrollees to other programs, and eliminating funding for uncompensated care). 
64. See Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir. of Ctr. For Medicaid, CHIP and Survey & 
Certification, Dep’t of Health & Human Services, to State Medicaid Dirs. (Feb. 25, 2011), 
available at http://downloads.cms.gov/cmsgov/archived-downloads/SMDL/downloads/ 
SMD11001.pdf (informing State Medicaid Directors that states are obligated to maintain 
Medicaid “eligibility standards, methodologies, and procedures” under §1902(gg) and that states 
must also maintain CHIP maintenance of effort “eligibility standards, methods, and procedures” 
under §2101(d)(3)). 
65. See Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., to Governors 
(July 10, 2012), available at http://capsules.kaiserhealthnews.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ 
Secretary-Sebelius-Letter-to-the-Governors-071012.pdf (notifying governors that states have the 
choice of whether or not to participate in the Medicaid expansion, and should they choose to 
abstain from participation in the expansion, the federal government will exempt those whom 
Congress determines cannot afford coverage from the individual responsibility provision). 
66. See Tracy Jan, 44,000 To Lose Medicaid Coverage In Maine, BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 23, 
2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/02/22/maine-governor-cuts-medicaid-
some-gop-colleagues-choose-expansion/QpZusfrOXCvm9EAh91YfnJ/story.html (noting that 
20,000 Maine residents have lost benefits due to immediate cuts, while another 24,000 are 
expected to lose benefits by the end of 2013). 
67. See Robert E. Moffit & Alyene Senger, Medicare’s Rising Costs – and the Urgent Need 
for Reform, 2779 BACKGROUNDER 1, 9 (2013), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/ 
2013/pdf/bg2779.pdf (stating that some of the top down administrative prices in the current 
system are too low to be attractive to providers, meaning that providers essentially control costs 
by choosing which prices they will offer). 
68. See Kevin Quinn, Achieving Cost Control, Care Coordination, and Quality Improvement 
in the Medicaid Program, 33 J. OF AMBULATORY CARE MGMT. 38, 42 (stating that though state 
legislatures vary in the leeway that they give to Medicaid agencies, in that some have broad 
discretion, while others require strict legislative approval, federal law give states control over 
Medicaid pricing). 
69. See Financing & Reimbursement, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-
CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Financing-and-Reimbursement/Financing-and-
Reimbursement.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2013) (showing how the average state Federal Medical 
Assistance Percentage varies by the per capita income in each state and by each three-year cycle, 
and how states then establish their own Medicaid provider payment rates within federal 
requirements). 
70. See Ellyn R. Boukus et al., A Snapshot of U.S. Physicians: Key Findings from the 2008 
Health Tracking Physician Survey, 35 DATA BULLETIN 1, 3, 7–9 tbl.4a–b (Sept. 2009), available 
at http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/1078/1078.pdf (showing that physician acceptance of 
new patients varied based on several characteristics, and that practices were less likely to accept 
new Medicaid patients). 
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acceptance of new Medicaid beneficiaries.71  By 2011, the national average of 
physician acceptance rate for new Medicaid patients was sixty-nine percent.72  This 
national average masked considerable state and regional variance, however.73  
 The crucial distinguishing variable between the states is that greater 
acceptance of new Medicaid patients appears to correlate with higher state 
Medicaid to Medicare fee ratios.74  Remarkably, the administered pricing regimen 
doctors love to hate—Medicare—appears to function as the minimum acceptable 
reimbursement rate for other government funded health insurance.75  Looked at 
from another perspective, the closer Medicaid provider reimbursement is to 
Medicare provider reimbursement in a given jurisdiction, the more likely Medicaid 
provider participation approaches Medicare provider participation levels.76  
 The ACA attempted to build on this insight by explicitly courting primary 
care providers to take on new Medicaid beneficiaries by awarding a two year pay 
raise based on Medicare-Medicaid primary care pay parity.77  It is estimated the pay 
raise would total a seventy-three percent pay raise for primary care providers 
accepting Medicaid patients.78  Federal approval of the two year pay raise has, 
however, been slow.79  And it is set to terminate on schedule, although it did not 
begin on schedule.80  
 
71. See id. (showing that there were wide differences in physician acceptance of patients, 
which depended on whether or not a patient had recently been added to the new Medicaid 
expansion). 
72. National Health Care Surveys: Physicians Accepting New Medicaid Patients by State, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/factsheets/ 
factsheet_nhcs.pdf (last updated Dec. 2012). 
73. See id. (noting that the percentage of physicians accepting Medicaid in New Jersey, for 
example, is only forty percent, which is far below the national average). 
74. Id. 
75. See id. (stating that states who had higher Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratios accepted more 
new Medicaid patients). 
76. See Enhanced Medicaid Reimbursement Rates for Primary Care Services, AM. COLL. OF 
PHYSICIANS, INC.  1 (2013), http://www.acponline.org/advocacy/where_we_stand/assets/v1-
enhanced-medicaid-reimbursement-rates.pdf (noting a survey that found half of primary care 
physicians would increase their Medicaid case load if Medicaid reimbursement rates were 
increased to the level of Medicare reimbursement rates). 
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(13)(C) (2006) (increasing Federal Medical Assistance 
Percentages for primary care services for 2013 and 2014). 
78. See STEPHEN ZUCKERMAN & DANA GOIN, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HOW MUCH WILL 
MEDICAID PHYSICIAN FEES FOR PRIMARY CARE RISE IN 2013? EVIDENCE FROM A 2012 SURVEY 
OF MEDICAID PHYSICIAN FEES 2 (Dec. 2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files. 
wordpress.com/2013/01/8398.pdf (stating that Medicaid physician fees will increase for primary 
care services by 73%). 
79. See Phil Galewitz, Few Medicaid Docs Have Seen 2013 Pay Raise, CAPSULES –THE 
KHN BLOG (July 16, 2013, 6:03 AM), http://capsules.kaiserhealthnews.org/index.php/2013/07/ 
few-medicaid-docs-have-seen-2013-pay-raise/?referrer=search (stating that many primary care 
doctors are still waiting for the Medicaid pay increase, though the government has just recently 
approved applications to start paying doctors the higher rates). 
80. See id. (noting that though the government has delayed the two year pay increase, it will 
still end less than eighteen months after it begins). 
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 Part of the difficulty has been logistical; the Medicaid managed care fee 
schedule is not easily mapped onto Medicare’s dominant fee-for-service 
reimbursement schedule.81  A further part of the difficulty has been political, where 
the Obama administration found itself simultaneously requested to approve 
California’s application for the fee increase, while endorsing California Medicaid’s 
determination to keep Medi-Cal reimbursement rates among the lowest in the 
nation.82  The early administratively-oriented delays bred further delays as 
uncertainty over reimbursement increases prevented some providers from 
identifying themselves as willing to accept Medicaid patients83—closing the 
window on retroactive reimbursement that might have counterweighed 
administrative delays.84 
1. How Low Can You Go? 
 Nowhere are the Medicaid reimbursement laws more contentious, and also 
more portentous, than in California.85  California has over seven million Medicaid 
beneficiaries as of this writing, a number ultimately expected to grow by as much 
as a further two million under the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.86  California is 
different because of the magnitude of the scale.  California is a bellwether state and 
Medi-Cal is a bellwether Medicaid program.87 
 
81. See id. (stating that one of the obstacles in implementing the program is in determining 
how Medicaid managed firms can apply the raise when doctors receive a monthly fee per patient 
rather than for each patient’s claim). 
82. See id. (showing the political conflicts in Obama’s approval of California’s request for 
the lower pay, and California Medicaid officials’ request for the higher pay). 
83. See id. (noting that many states set the deadline for April or May for doctors to attest 
their willingness to accept new Medicaid patients; however, many physicians missed the deadline 
and as a consequence, these physicians will fail to get the pay increase unless they fill out a form 
showing that they are licensed as a family doctor, pediatrician, or internist). 
84. See id. (stating that doctors who missed their state’s deadline will only be able to receive 
retroactive pay once they fill out a form showing that they are licensed as a family doctor, 
pediatrician, or internist). 
85. See Bruce C. Vladeck & Stephen I. Vladeck, Op-Ed., Killing Medicaid the California 
Way, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2011, at A31 (stating that many problems exist in implementing 
Medicaid reimbursement laws in California, including: 1) the United States Department of Health 
and Human Services does not have the resources to ensure compliance with the equal access 
provision; 2) the department would encounter issues with the enforcement budget; 3) even with 
proper funding, the department has limited authority to provide remedies for violations; and 4) 
even if the justices rule for California, Congress could potentially fix the problems outlined 
previously, but it is unlikely that there will be a “true legislative fix”). 
86. See CAL. BUDGET PROJECT, EXPANDING HORIZONS: KEY FACTS ABOUT THE MEDI-CAL 
PROGRAM AS CALIFORNIA IMPLEMENTS HEALTH CARE REFORM 48 (Apr. 2013), 
http://www.cbp.org/pdfs/2013/130402_Expanding_Horizons.pdf (noting that the Medicaid 
Program in California currently provides coverage for over 7 million residents); Christine Vestal, 
Why new Medicaid enrollment is soaring, USA TODAY (Nov. 6, 2013, 12:12 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/06/new-medicaid-enrollment-healthcare/ 
3453929/ (stating that the ACA Medi-Cal program would include 1.4 additional residents). 
87. See Chris Rauber, California Accounts For One-Third Of Obamacare’s Puny 106,000 
October Enrollees, S. F. BUS. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2013, 12:48 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/ 
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 California is also different because of the state’s enduring resistance to 
moving Medicaid reimbursement closer to that of Medicare.88  This is a storied 
history, whose modern version began with a 2008 decision to reduce Medi-Cal 
provider reimbursement rates.89  Litigation ensued, testing the idea that Medicaid 
reimbursement rates might move so low that Medicaid’s access provisions would 
be violated.90  The Ninth Circuit agreed that the proposed cuts impinged on 
Medicaid beneficiary access.91  The Obama administration then endorsed the 
proposed cuts.92  In 2012, the United States Supreme Court sent the case back to 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals where the reimbursement cuts were eventually 
approved.93  A staged roll out of the reimbursement cuts began September 1, 
2013.94 
2. Medicaid Reimbursement Rates and Patient Access to Care Issues 
 Patient access to Medicaid care is not widely studied.  There is no nationwide 
data set on Medicaid patient wait times or physician acceptance of new Medicaid 
 
sanfrancisco/blog/2013/11/california-accounts-for-one-third-of.html?s=print (stating that 
California has long been regarded as a bellwether state for the Affordable Care Act); Cheryl 
Clark, 1 in 3 Medi-Cal Enrollees Delay Care on Cost Concerns, HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA (May 
31, 2012), https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/print/fin-280737/1-in-3-MediCal-Enrollees-
Delay-Care-on-Cost-Concerns (stating that many see Medi-Cal as a bellwether program). 
88. See Vladeck & Vladeck, supra note 85 (discussing the California Legislature’s 2008 
“across-the board 10 percent cut” in reimbursement rates for Medi-Cal). 
89. Id. 
90. See Toby Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctrs. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1209 (2012) 
(noting that Medicaid providers and beneficiaries brought a series of cases arguing that 
California’s reductions in the Medicaid reimbursement rates violated the federal provisions). 
91. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644, 657 (9th Cir. 2009), 
vacated and remanded by Toby Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 
(2012) (“Even if we were to interpret § 30(A) to mandate a substantive rather than procedural 
result, the ten percent rate reduction might still conflict with the quality of care and access 
provisions of § 30(A), as the cuts have apparently forced at least some providers to stop treating 
Medi–Cal beneficiaries.”).  
92. See Letter from Gloria Nagle, Assoc. Reg’l Adm’r, Div. of Medicaid & Children’s 
Health Operations, to Toby Douglas, Director, California Department of Health Care Serv. (Oct. 
27, 2011) (determining that California’s reduction in reimbursement rates complied with section 
1902(a)(30)(A) of the Social Security Act).  
93. See Toby Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2012) 
(remanding the cases to the Ninth Circuit to decide whether the cases “may proceed directly under 
the Supremacy Clause not that the agency has acted”); Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 716 
F.3d 1235, 1240–41 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that “the Secretary’s approval of California’s 
requested reimbursement rates . . . is entitled to deference”). 
94. See Appellate Rejects Effort to Block Medicaid Cuts in California, MODERN 
HEALTHCARE (July 2, 2013), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130702/NEWS/ 
307029935 (reporting that payment reductions in Medi-Cal will be implemented on September 1, 
2013); see also Implementation of AB 97 Reductions, DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES (2013), 
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/Documents/AB97ImplementationAnnouncemen081413.pdf (listing 
provider categories impacted by the implementation of rate reductions and the dates upon which 
these provider categories will begin to see the reductions).  
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patients.95  Locality specific and disease specific data is partial, but illuminating, 
however.96  
 For nine consecutive years, the Massachusetts Medical Society surveyed 
patient access to care data, including surveying acceptance rates of Medicaid 
(known as MassHealth in Massachusetts) by physicians.97  Only seven physician 
specialties are surveyed, but family medicine and internal medicine, the two major 
primary care specialties, are among them.98  These surveys have significant 
limitations, not the least of which is that they tell the patient access tale from the 
provider’s perspective, but they are still useful for comparative data.99  Both in 
2011 and 2012, for example, primary care specialties were the least likely to accept 
MassHealth,100 with only sixty-six percent of internists participating.101  By 
contrast, ninety percent of family medicine practitioners accepted Medicaid  and 
eighty five percent of internists surveyed  accept Medicare.102  In that only forty-
five percent of all internists are accepting new patients of any type,103 this likely 
leaves somewhat less than sixty-six percent of internists accepting new Medicaid 
patients. 
 Access to specialists, ironically, is easier than access to primary care 
providers in Massachusetts, creating a sort of Medicaid primary care bottleneck.104  
 
95. But see Anna S. Sommers et al., Physician Willingness and Resources to Serve More 
Medicaid Patients: Perspectives from Primary Care Physicians, 2 MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
RESEARCH E1, E2-E3 (2011) (using data from a national survey of physicians to compare the 
number of primary care physicians to the number of accepted patients with Medicaid). See 
generally THOMAS C. BUCHMUELLER ET AL., NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE EFFECT 
OF MEDICAID PAYMENT RATES ON ACCESS TO DENTAL CARE AMONG CHILDREN 7–8 (2013) 
[hereinafter BUCHMUELLER ET AL.] (discussing the partial nature of the Medicaid data set as part 
of the methodology discussion of study concerning the relationship between Medicaid 
reimbursement and Medicaid access for pediatric dental services). 
96. See generally BUCHMUELLER ET AL., supra note 95, at 7 (noting that most of the studies 
analyzing the relationship between Medicaid physicians and access to care are disease specific or 
“come[] from research on single states.”). 
97. See generally MASS. MED. SOC’Y, 2013 MMS PATIENT ACCESS TO CARE STUDY (2013) 
(reporting the findings of the Massachusetts Medical Society’s ninth annual health care wait times 
study for the following specialties: family medicine, internal medicine, cardiology, 
gastroenterology, obstetrics/gynecology, orthopedic surgery, and pediatrics). 
98. Id. at 3. 
99. See JOHN HSU ET AL., MASS. MED. SOC’Y, MASSACHUSETTS MEDICAL SOCIETY: 
PHYSICIAN SURVEY ON GLOBAL PAYMENTS 3 (2012) (discussing the limitations of the study, 
which includes basing the results on “physician self reported perceptions”). 
100. See 2013 MMS PATIENT ACCESS TO CARE STUDIES, supra note 97, at 9 (reporting that 
MassHealth acceptance was the lowest in 2011 and 2012 in internal medicine offices and family 
medicine offices, which are two examples of primary care specialties); see also COMMON HEALTH 
FOR THE COMMONWEALTH: MASSACHUSETTS REPORT ON PREVENTABLE DETERMINANTS OF 
HEALTH, MASS. HEALTH COUNCIL 7 (Hollis Burkhart et al. eds., 7th ed. 2012) (reporting that 
primary care specialties were the least likely to accept MassHealth). 
101.See 2013 MMS PATIENT ACCESS TO CARE STUDY, supra note 97, at 9 fig.4. 
102. See id. at 12, 15. 
103. Id. at 13 (finding “[t]he number of internal medicine physicians accepting new patients” 
fell from fifty-one percent to forty-five percent). 
104. See MMS Study Shows Patient Wait Times for Primary Care Still Long, MASS. MED. 
	   8/17/14	  
2014]	   	  THE MEDICAID GAMBLE	   71	  
Whether there is a shortage of primary care providers is a contentious topic.105  The 
primary care bottleneck might be just as easily removed by the expansion of non-
physician primary care gatekeepers.106  But the gamble here is that this debate—
driven by public pressure —will force resolution of the Massachusetts primary care 
access bottleneck. 
 The adequate access at lower rates conundrum seems particularly pronounced 
in rural areas.107  Missouri, for example, pays half the Medicare primary rate for 
Medicaid primary care services, compared to the rest of the region.108  It is 
suggested that while Medicaid “reimbursement levels have a linear relationship 
with provider participation”.109  Medicaid reimbursement rates alone cannot tell the 
story of relatively low primary care provider participation in Medicaid.110 
D. Administrative Challenges 
 A parallel story on administrative complexity, particularly under capitated 
contracts, should also be told.111  Increases in paperwork and capitation combined 
 
SOC’Y (July 15, 2013), http://www.massmed.org/News-and-Publications/MMS-News-
Releases/MMS-Study-Shows-Patient-Wait-Times-for-Primary-Care-Still-Long/#.UobTivkqiSo 
(finding access to specialists to be easier than access to primary care); 2013 MMS PATIENT 
ACCESS TO CARE STUDY, MASS. MED. SOC’Y 10, 16 (2013) (reporting that specialists such as 
cardiologists are accepting 85% of new patients, whereas only 51% of all family medicine 
physicians are accepting new patients); see also BUILDING A PRIMARY CARE WORKFORCE FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY, NAT’L ASS’N OF CMTY. HEALTH CTRS. ET AL. 1 (2008) (discussing how the 
implementation of universal insurance coverage in Massachusetts “has created a primary health 
care bottleneck”).  
105. See Kevin Sack, In Massachusetts, Universal Coverage Strains Care, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
5, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/05/us/05doctors.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the 
current debate about the shortage of primary care providers, and how some researchers have found 
that the high number of doctors in the U.S. is causing an overutilization of the system). 
106. See David Muzina, A Fix for the Health Decision Bottleneck, HEALTHCARE INSIGHTS 
(May 1, 2013), http://lab.express-scripts.com/industry-updates/a-fix-for-the-health-decision-
bottleneck/ (arguing that the primary care bottleneck could be alleviated by “pushing less critical 
components of healthcare down to non-physicians.”).  Of course, the necessary relaxation of 
relevant scope of practice laws and doctrines might not be as simple.  See Mark D. Schwartz, 
Health Care Reform and the Primary Care Workforce Bottleneck, 27 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 469, 
469–71 (2011) (discussing the different laws and policies that need to be implemented in order to 
address the serious workforce bottleneck issue that has been created due to high patient demand 
and low physician supply, and how the implementation of these laws will not be a simple 
process). 
107. See PAM SILBERMAN ET AL., THE IMPACT OF MEDICAID CUTS ON RURAL 
COMMUNITIES, NORTH CAR. RURAL HEALTH RESEARCH AND POLICY ANALYSIS CTR. 14 (2005) 
(finding that barriers to health care access are “more acute in rural areas”). 
108. MO. FOUND. FOR HEALTH AND THE HEALTH CARE FOUND. OF GREATER KAN. CITY, 
MEDICAID RATES AND PROVIDER PARTICIPATION: CONSIDERATIONS FOR MISSOURI POLICY 
MAKERS, 5 (2008). 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 4 (discussing how the reduction of reimbursement rates when state budgets are 
tight and increasing the reimbursement rates when state revenues increase only brings to light the 
complications of provider participation in Medicaid). 
111. See id. at 7 (arguing that doctors may be less eager to accept the administrative overhead 
  
72	   JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY	   [VOL. 17:	  
with low payment levels create the perfect storm of limited access to primary care 
for Medicaid beneficiaries.112  
 Huge systematic changes in physician employment are also taking place in 
ways that may increase Medicaid payment acceptability among primary care 
physicians as well.113  Physicians are increasingly employees of health care 
institutions rather than self-employed.114  Physician employees and physicians in 
large group practices are more likely to accept Medicaid, often dropping charity 
care in the process.115  Whether this is driven by the fact that larger, better staffed 
practices enable primary care providers to deal with the bureaucracy of Medicaid or 
whether larger practices are better equipped to bill for all services, Medicaid 
beneficiaries are more likely than other insured individuals to receive care in larger 
practices or institutional settings.116  
 Finally, Medicaid beneficiary access to care is also a function of community 
characteristics and demographics.  Low income individuals disproportionately live 
in medically underserved areas.117  Modest adjustments to Medicaid reimbursement 
rates are unlikely to change this.118  Patterns of residential segregation by income119 
 
associated with managed care and capitated contracts as compared to fee-for-service 
reimbursement). 
112. See id. at 6–7 (arguing that fee levels, administrative overhead, and managed care 
penetration are contributing factors to Medicaid beneficiaries limited access to primary care). 
113. See id. at 7 (explaining that larger practices are more likely to see more Medicaid 
patients); see also THE PHYSICIANS FOUND., HEALTH REFORM AND THE DECLINE OF PHYSICIAN 
PRIVATE PRACTICE 7 (2010), available at http://www.physiciansfoundation.org/uploads/default/ 
Health_Reform_and_the_Decline_of_Physician_Private_Practice.pdf [hereinafter THE 
PHYSICIANS FOUND.] (describing the systematic changes in health care where large practices are 
now the majority). 
114. See THE PHYSICIANS FOUND., supra note 113, at 7 (noting that as compared to 1900, 
small physician practices have become the minority of physician practice types). 
115. See MO. FOUNDATION FOR HEALTH, supra note 115, at 6 (stating that physician 
employees and physicians in large group are more likely to drop charity care and to start accepting 
Medicaid patients compared to physicians who are owners or in small practices). 
116. See PETER J. CUNNINGHAM & JESSICA H. MAY, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM 
CHANGE, MEDICAID PATIENTS INCREASINGLY CONCENTRATED AMONG PHYSICIANS 2–3 (2006), 
available at http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/866/866.pdf (noting that for various reasons, 
such as low Medicaid payment rates and high administrative burdens, the concentration of 
Medicaid patient care in large group and institution based practices is increasing while the care of 
Medicaid patients continues to shift away from small group practices). 
117. See People in Medically Underserved Areas, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., (2010), 
available at http://hrc.nwlc.org/status-indicators/people-medically-underserved-areas (explaining 
that a lack of accessible health care services, or living in a medically underserved area, is 
particularly acute for poor and low-income people). 
118. See LEIGHTON KU ET AL., GEIGER GIBSON/RCHN CMTY. HEALTH FOUND. RESEARCH 
COLLABORATIVE, ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF HEALTH REFORM ON HEALTH CENTERS’ 
CAPACITY TO EXPAND TO NEW MEDICALLY UNDERSERVED COMMUNITIES AND POPULATIONS 6 
(2009), available at http://sphhs.gwu.edu/departments/healthpolicy/DHP_Publications/ 
pub_uploads/dhpPublication_9889E996-5056-9D20-3D1F89027D3F9406.pdf (arguing that while 
higher funding levels may allow health centers to expand and serve additional low-income people 
in medically underserved areas, an estimated 56 million people will remain underserved due to 
being “medically disenfranchised”). 
119. See Dolores Acevedo-Garcia et al., Toward A Policy-Relevant Analysis Of Geographic 
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and the health care deserts that accompany them120 are deeply-seated in American 
patterns of residential segregation. 
 Seeking the solution to Medicaid budget battles in provider budgets is a 
gamble on its own terms.  Although substantial data exists that Medicaid provider 
reimbursement cuts correlate with lower utilization,121 it is still too soon to say 
whether Medicaid provider reimbursement cuts twinned with expanded Medicaid 
eligibility will produce the same effect. 
 In conventional fee-for-service Medicare, there is even some evidence that 
provider reimbursement cuts lead to more and not less care.122  Price levels, in fee-
for-service medicine, are a one dimensional approach to cost containment.123  
Medicaid is often not a fee-for-service program, however, so the analogy may not 
be entirely apt.124 
IV. VISIONS FOR MEDICAID 
A.  Why Make Medicaid Look More Like Medicare? 
 The conventional narrative on government-funded health insurance in the 
United States is that programs for poor people are poor programs.125  Further, our 
collective desire to segregate health insurance by economic class is supposed to 
demonstrate our collective hostility toward using government funded health 
insurance as an anti-poverty program,126 hence our reluctance to be generous with 
 
And Racial/Ethnic Disparities In Child Health, 27 HEALTH AFF. 321, 322 (2008) (noting that 
mounting evidence suggests that residential segregation is a key factor of health disparities).  But 
see P. Lobmayer, & R. G. Wilkinson, Inequality, Residential Segregation by Income, and 
Mortality in US Cities 56 J. EPIDEMIOL CMTY. HEALTH 183, 186 (2002) (concluding that income 
inequality is seemingly related to mortality independent of economic segregation). 
120. See Acevedo-Garcia et al., supra note 119, at 321 (noting that mounting evidence 
suggests that residential segregation is a key factor of health disparities). 
121. See Julia Bienstock, Administrative Oversight of State Medicaid Payment Policies: 
Giving Teeth to the Equal Access Provision, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 805, 807 (2012) (noting that 
states nonetheless continue to cut Medicaid reimbursement rates). 
122. Adrianna McIntyre, It’s Possible That Price Cuts Lead To More Care, Not Less, 
INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (July 31, 2013), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/its-
possible-that-price-cuts-lead-to-more-care-not-less (arguing that provider reimbursement cuts, 
such as those in the area of chemotherapy, actually lead to more treatment).  
123. See id. (arguing that price is one level in cost containment). 
124. See KAISER COMM’N. ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID MANAGED CARE: 
KEY DATA, TRENDS, AND ISSUES 1 (2012), available at 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8046-02.pdf (noting Medicaid’s 
increased use of managed care, as opposed to fee for service).  It is estimated that approximately 
seventy percent of all Medicaid beneficiaries are enrolled in some kind of Medicaid managed care, 
though disabled and senior beneficiaries remain disproportionately enrolled in fee-for-service 
Medicaid, accounting for about eighty percent of Medicaid spending.  Id. 
125. See CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE WELFARE STATE NOBODY KNOWS: DEBUNKING 
MYTHS ABOUT U.S. SOCIAL POLICY 6 (2007) (explaining that the common criticism “programs 
for the poor are poor programs” often means that programs for the poor, such as Medicaid, are 
politically vulnerable). 
126. See OLSON, supra note 36, at 2–3, 5 (noting that public policy and rhetoric towards 
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government-funded health insurance programs for the poor.127  And so the narrative 
goes that in Medicare—in stark contrast—we see the fullest flowering of our 
collective aspiration to protect all or most of our seniors from the vicissitudes of 
health care and health insurance markets but on the condition that little or no means 
testing128 temper our generosity.  It is, as it were, not so much an aversion to 
helping the poor as an aversion to singling out the poor alone for assistance.129  
This is why proposals for “Medicare for All” or “Federal Employees Health 
Benefits for All” routinely cycle through our great public debates on health care 
reform.130  
 We are conflicted.  Our distaste for the poor is at odds with our desire to level 
entitlements in the name of equality.131  Both drive us further away from income 
based programs and toward categorical eligibility as we re-conceive government-
funded health insurance.  It may be that the ACA’s public perception problem is, as 
David Orentlicher notes, that it “looks much more like Medicaid than Medicare”132 
and that this resemblance generates resistance among Americans.  By this 
reckoning, however, “Medicare for All” should be a crowd pleaser.  Understanding 
why it is not and has not been the American go-to health care reform proposal tells 
us something about ourselves. 
 
Medicaid, as detested by some, signifies an unrestricted right to aid with indifference to personal 
responsibility). 
127. See id. at 2 (noting that officials have sought to cut Medicaid funding frequently to the 
detriment of Medicaid enrollees). 
128. See id. at 26 (explaining that since inception, Medicaid, as a means tested “benevolence” 
program, was often stigmatized and connoted dependence while Medicare, based on the concept 
of social insurance, was considered a national entitlement).  The introduction of very modest 
Medicare means testing, at the margin, has been controversial as compared to Medicaid.  See 
Andrew G. Biggs, Means Testing and Its Limits 9 NAT’L. AFF. 97, 103–04 (2011), available at 
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20110919_Biggs.pdf (explaining the opposition, from both 
ends of the political spectrum, to the means-testing of Medicare); E.g., Paul Krugman, Means-
testing Medicare, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2011), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/ 
means-testing-medicare (arguing that means-testing Medicare, in the same fashion as Medicaid, is 
a badly designed idea and unfair form of taxation). 
129. See Biggs, supra note 128, at 103 (explaining that many politicians believe that 
Americans will not support programs “in which redistribution toward the poor is too overt”). 
130. See David Orentlicher, Rights to Healthcare in the United States: Inherently Unstable, 38 
AM. J.L. & MED. 326, 346 (2012) (noting the single-payer debate during the passage of the ACA 
shows the present-day political barrier to enacting a Medicare-for-all system). See generally Ida 
Hellander, Evidence Supports Medicare For All, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 7, 2013), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/06/07/evidence-supports-medicare-for-all (showing that even 
after the passage of the ACA, debate over “Medicare for All” is still alive and well). 
131. See NORMAN DANIELS ET AL., BENCHMARKS OF FAIRNESS FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM 
15–16 (1996) (explaining that commentators have supported the notion that Americans lack the 
culture or values to support universal access to medical service, but at the same time claim, poll 
after poll, that access to health care is a right). 
132. The Unraveling of Obamacare, HEALTH LAW PROF BLOG (July 3, 2013), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/healthlawprof_blog/2013/07/obamacare-and-the-instability-of-
us-rights-to-health-care.html. 
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 If the ACA’s goal was to make Medicaid look more like Medicare, it was 
probably designed to make Medicaid look more like Medicare as Medicare for 
All’s advocates have advanced it133—a universal health care system—than as it was 
passed—a categorical eligibility based system with no means testing.134  Just as the 
passage of an abbreviated Medicare marked another skirmish in the war for 
Medicare’s soul, the abbreviation of the ACA by the Supreme Court has marked 
another skirmish in the war over the Medicaid’s soul. 
 Surely the ACA’s implementers knew what they were doing when they began 
a campaign to convert all relevant Code of Federal Regulations language from 
Medicaid enrollees to Medicaid beneficiaries.135  Medicaid enrollees have always 
just been that—unlike Medicare beneficiaries—a naming convention emphasizing 
the provisional, conditional nature of the Medicaid entitlement.  And the 
announcement accompanying the change acknowledged as much.136   
 The Code of Federal Regulations was revised on 15 and 16 July 2012 to 
change the word “recipient” to “beneficiary.”137  The following is excerpted from 
77 FR 29002-01, which appeared on May 16, 2012 in the Federal Register: 
Removal of the Term “Recipient” for Medicaid: We have removed the 
term “recipient” from current CMS regulations and made a 
nomenclature change to replace “recipient” with “beneficiary” 
throughout the CFR. In response to comments from the public to 
discontinue our use of the unflattering term “recipient” under Medicaid, 
we have been using the term “beneficiary” to mean all individuals who 
are eligible for Medicare or Medicaid services.138 
Just what is unflattering about the term “recipient” may be understood only in 
context; similarly, what is empowering about “beneficiary” may also only be 
 
133. See OLSON, supra note 36, at 24 (noting that Johnson succeeded in passing universal 
health insurance for the elderly with Medicare). 
134. See Austin Frakt, Bye-Bye Medicaid Asset Test, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Apr. 13, 
2010), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/bye-bye-medicaid-asset-test/ (arguing that the 
ACA’s categorical net income standard does away with Medicaid means-testings); Olson, supra 
note 36, at 24 (noting that Johnson, like his predecessor Kennedy, proposed universal health 
insurance for the elderly).  Cf., Orentlicher, supra note 142, at 330 (noting, in contrast to what was 
proposed, as passed, Medicare took on three distinct forms: Medicare Part A and B for all seniors, 
and Medicaid as a limited, means-tested, program for the poor). 
135. See Medicare and Medicaid Program; Regulatory Provisions to Promote Program 
Efficiency, Transparency, and Burden Reduction, 77 Fed. Reg. 29,002, 29,002–03 (May 16, 2012) 
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. ch. 4) (noting the change from the term ‘‘recipient’’ to ‘‘beneficiary’’ 
to mean all individuals eligible for Medicare or Medicaid services). 
136. See Medicare and Medicaid Program; Regulatory Provisions to Promote Program 
Efficiency, Transparency, and Burden Reduction, 77 Fed. Reg. 29,002, 29,002–03 (explaining the 
change from “recipient” to “beneficiary” throughout the C.F.R. as a result of public perception of 
“recipient” as “unflattering”). 
137.  Id. at 29,002 (the regulations became effective July 16, 2012). 
138. Id. at 29,002–03. 
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understood in context.139  Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries now stand on equal 
dignatorial ground. 
B.  Should Medicaid Look More Like Commercial Insurance? 
1. The California Story: Expanding Medicaid While Lowering Medicaid 
Provider Reimbursement 
 Nowhere is our ambivalence over Medicaid, as an anti-poverty program or as 
a playing field leveler, more fully expressed than in California’s current drive to 
expand Medicaid to one in four Californians while continuously seeking to lower 
Medicaid provider reimbursement to ever lower levels.140  With one hand, 
California floods the market with the newly Medicaid eligible,141 and with the other 
it drives Medicaid provider reimbursement—and Medicaid provider participation—
even lower.  Consequently, this creates the paradox of more Medicaid eligible 
Californians competing for even fewer Medicaid participating providers.142  
Medicaid, in this context, is more a license to hunt than a guarantee to access.  
 Medicaid reimbursement is part of a system of administered pricing.  By 
contrast, commercial insurance must, by definition, incorporate provider rates set 
by the market.  Medicaid provider reimbursement rates are set by each participating 
state subject only to the limiting caveat that the rates not be organized in such a 
way as to explicitly limit the beneficiaries’ access to providers.143  Never 
definitively defined and rarely tested, the important question of how low a state 
may go in setting Medicaid provider reimbursement rates to restrict Medicaid 
 
139. Recipient is used to identify a receiver of something, whereas beneficiary identifies a 
person who is helped by something.  See Recipient, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/recipient (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) (defining 
recipient as “a person who receives something”); Beneficiary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/beneficiary (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) (defining 
beneficiary as “a person . . . that is helped by something”).  The distinction may lie in the 
charitable recipient implication of recipient and the earned benefit implication of beneficiary.  
140. See The California Health Benefit Exchange Aligned with Medi-Cal, CAL. HEALTHCARE 
FOUND. 1, 7 (Oct. 2011) (noting that California expects to have one in four of its citizens enrolled 
in Medi-Cal by 2014, but that Medi-Cal physician reimbursement rates are significantly lower 
than those of private insurers). 
141. See Daniel Weintraub, Much of ACA Already in Place, CAL. HEALTH REPORT (Aug. 19, 
2013), http://www.healthycal.org/archives/13326 (noting that California has expanded coverage 
for its low-income residents). 
142. See Physician Participation in Medi-Cal, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND. (July 2010) 
http://www.chcf.org/publications/2010/07/physician-participation-in-medical (discussing a study 
that found California physicians to be much less likely to accept new Medi-Cal patients than 
patients who are privately insured or on Medicare, despite the expected growth in eligible Medi-
Cal patients due to new rules). 
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(19) (2006) (ensuring that the state plan for medical assistance 
“provides safeguards” that are in the “best interest of the recipient”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a 
(11(B)(ii)) (2006) (providing that the state plan for medical assistance must reimburse any 
“agency, institution, or organization” for the individual care provided to a recipient). 
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beneficiaries’ access to health care remains undetermined, but California’s how-
low-can-you-go litigation is instructive.144 
 There is, however, a discernible pattern where making Medicaid broader has 
also made it thinner.  As  Avik Roy points out “that there is a rough correlation of 
states with extensive Medicaid programs to those with poor [Medicaid] physician 
reimbursement.”145  Roy concludes from this that manipulation of Medicaid 
provider rates is the mechanism by which blue states reduce their Medicaid 
populations without running afoul of federal constraints on open Medicaid 
beneficiary disenrollment.146  But this is too simple.  Although Medicaid 
reimbursement rates appear to play a significant role in Medicaid provider 
participation in the program,147 Roy cannot square this method of Medicaid 
enrollment re-calibration with states’ goal of gaming the system by increasing 
Medicaid spending.148  States cannot game the federal matching dollars if they do 
not have expenditures, so clearly something more complex is going on here.  The 
problem is that provider “underpayment” and “overpayment” are relative terms.  
Roy compares Medicaid provider reimbursement to Medicare reimbursement, 
commercial insurance reimbursement, and to Medicaid reimbursement across states 
without any consideration of provider supply, market dominance, and market 
concentration.149  Reading reimbursement rates as if they made sense across 
markets is unhelpful.  
 
 
 
 
144. See Raising Medicaid Reimbursement to Increase Provider Participation, MISSOURI 
FOUND. FOR HEALTH, available at http://www.mffh.org/mm/files/Factsheet_ 
ReimbursementRates.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2014) (explaining that the federal Medicaid law 
does not set precise requirements for state reimbursement of individual medical providers); see, 
e.g., Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (involving a challenge 
to California statutes that reduce Medicaid reimbursement).  
145. Avik Roy, How Do Blue States Expand Medicaid? By Paying Doctors Less, 
FORBES.COM, THE APOTHECARY BLOG (July 23, 2012, 11:24pm), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2012/07/23/how-do-blue-states-expand-medicaid-by-
paying-doctors-less/. 
146. See id. (stating that the current recession has provided less Medicaid funding from the 
federal government to the states, and thus states pay doctors less to reduce Medicaid spending 
without decreasing Medicaid rolls). 
147. See Chapin White, A Comparison of Two Approaches to Increasing Access to Care: 
Expanding Coverage versus Increasing Physician Fees, 47 HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH 963, 979 
(June 2012) (explaining that there is a correlation between utilization of physicians participating in 
Medicaid and reimbursement of these physicians). 
148. See Medicaid: Designed to Fail, PHYSICIANS FOR REFORM, 
http://www.physiciansforreform.org/our-plan/medicare-medicaid/medicaid-designed-fail/ (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2013) (identifying the “game” played by states whereby they increase Medicaid 
spending in order to receive more federal money). 
149. See Roy, supra note 145 (stating only the percentage different states pay through 
Medicare versus what private insurers pay). 
  
78	   JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY	   [VOL. 17:	  
C.  Medicaid Expansion 
1. Arizona Retains Its Original 1980s Waiver 
 Arizona, to this date, operates what it describes as its state Medicaid program 
under a section 1115 waiver originally bargained in the 1980s.150  Ultimately 
coerced by the cost of uncompensated indigent care, Arizona came onboard with 
original Medicaid on October 1, 1982.151  Arizona’s current governor does not 
seem eager to be a poster child for health care reform done right, outside the 
ACA.152  At one point there were other fleeting candidates for that role but the 
interest has now coalesced around health care reform done right, inside the ACA.153  
 Arkansas is the current leading contender,154 though HHS’s provisional 
approval of a premium support program, or privatized Medicaid expansion, will not 
really mean much until the financial terms of the plan are disclosed.155  What is 
known is that “cost effectiveness” (the sine qua non of Medicaid premium support 
programs) may be in the eye of the beholder.  This is especially significant in light 
of the phrasing of the most recent invitation to the states to apply for 1115 waivers.  
This invitation broadened the phrase “cost effectiveness” to both include 
consideration of the calculation of the cost of churning in the Medicaid eligible 
 
150. See Arizona Medicaid Waiver, Disability Services & Waivers, MEDICAIDWAIVER.ORG, 
available at http://medicaidwaiver.org/state/arizona.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2013) (explaining 
that the Arizona Medicaid program, the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System 
(AHCCCS), began in 1982 as a section 1115 Demonstration Waiver); see also Howard E. 
Freeman & Bradford L. Kirkman-Liff,  Health Care Under AHCCCS: An Examination of 
Arizona’s Alternative to Medicaid, HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH 245, 246 (Aug. 1985) (describing 
Arizona’s adoption of its Medicaid system). 
151. See Freeman & Kirkman-Liff, supra note 150, at 245–46 (explaining Arizona’s adoption 
of Medicaid as a result of its inability to maintain its system for administering medical care to the 
poor at the time). 
152. See Ronald Brownstein, Why the GOPs Resistance to Medicaid Expansion is Eroding, 
NAT’L J. (Feb. 7, 2013), available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/political-
connections/why-the-gop-s-resistance-to-medicaid-expansion-is-eroding-20130207 (noting that 
Republican Arizona Governor Jan Brewer is uncharacteristically pushing for an expansion of 
Medicaid under the ACA in order to receive more federal funding for providing health care to a 
large number of uninsured people, despite the “rocky” relationship between Governor Brewer and 
President Obama). 
153. See, e.g., Trip Gabriel, Medicaid Expansion is Set for Ohioans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 
2013, at A12 (describing Republican Governor John Kasich’s push to expand Medicaid in Ohio, 
despite his previous opposition to the ACA). 
154. See, e.g., Gillian Mohney, Arkansas Leads Way on Alternate Route for Medicaid 
Expansion, ABC NEWS (Oct. 4, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/health/2013/10/04/arkansas-
leads-way-on-alternate-route-for-medicaid-expansion/ (describing Arkansas’s means of expanding 
the Medicaid program by using federal money to “purchase private insurance plans” for Medicaid 
participants). 
155. See Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to 
Andy Allison, Dir., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. (Sept. 27, 2013) available at 
http://posting.arktimes.com/media/pdf/arkansassignedapprovalltr.pdf.  
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population and include the cost reductions possible through increased 
competition.156   
 Whatever “cost effectiveness” turns out to mean, it will be of intense interest 
to try to calculate whether the value of the increased insured population in some 
state exchanges will enhance insurance rate competition and benefit all exchange 
purchasers, not just Medicaid premium funded purchasers.  If the Congressional 
Budget Office is even close to accurate, it will cost the federal government $6,000 
a year to cover another individual American under Medicaid expansion but $9,000 
a year to cover the same individual under a Medicaid private option purchased 
commercial insurance plan157 (with the wrap around coverage and premium 
subsidies necessary to make the commercial insurance “Medicaid-like”); there are 
going to be some interesting offset calculations ahead.   
 While much of our attention is directed at the federalism arena sparring 
between the states and the federal government,158 not enough attention has been 
paid to the sparring between and among political units within the states over the 
Medicaid expansion.  Consider California, for example.  For several decades, 
California worked hard at unwinding its statewide safety net.159  The full story 
would talk about county by county variable standards for public assistance, or the 
incredible inconsistency with which Medi-Cal applications were processed, but the 
real bottom line is the state’s forcing the counties to assume responsibility for 
medical indigents.160  Seen from one perspective, California has perfected 
devolving the apparatus of the welfare state to the political unit closest to 
 
156. See Section 1115 Demonstrations, MEDICAID.GOV (last accessed Nov. 16, 2013), 
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/Waivers.html (describing the Section 1115 Waiver as a means for states to create 
experimental systems that “improve care, increase efficiency, and reduce costs”); see also 
Adrianna McIntyre, Mediating Churn, Arkansas Edition, PROJECT MILLENNIAL (July 4, 2013) 
http://projectmillennial.org/2013/07/04/mediating-churn-arkansas-edition/ (identifying prevention 
of churning between coverage types as one of the intended consequences of Arkansas’s proposed 
1115 waiver private option plan). 
157. See Avik Roy, CBO Guesstimates that the Supreme Court’s Impact on Obamacare is 
Modest, FORBES.COM, THE APOTHECARY BLOG (July 24, 2012, 3:15 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/07/24/cbo-guesstimates-that-obamacare-will-cover-3-
million-less-people-after-the-supreme-court-saving-84-billion/ (discussing the Congressional 
Budget Office’s estimates of how ACA costs will impact the deficit). 
158. See, e.g., Scott L. Greer and Peter D. Jacobson, Health Care Reform and Federalism, 35 
J. OF HEALTH POL., POL’Y, AND L. 203, 205 (2010) (developing criteria to determine whether the 
federal government or the states should lead health care reform). 
159. See KIM BELSHE & SHANNON MCCONVILLE, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., RETHINKING 
THE STATE-LOCAL RELATIONSHIP: HEALTH CARE, 7 (2013), available at http://www.ppic.org/ 
content/pubs/report/R_213KBR.pdf. (discussing the evolution of California’s Health Care Safety 
Net Programs from 1966 to 1991). 
160. See HEALTH ACCESS FOUND., CALIFORNIA’S UNEVEN SAFETY NET: A SURVEY OF 
COUNTY HEALTH CARE 1–4 (2013), available at http://www.health-access.org/files/ 
expanding/California's%20Uneven%20Safety%20Net%20%20A%20Survey%20of%20County%2
0Health%20Care.pdf (discussing how counties have “a highly variable patchwork of indigent care 
and safety-net programs and services” based on a county’s specific circumstances, demographics, 
politics, and resources). 
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community life.  Seen from another perspective, unevenly burdened counties 
(particularly those with high populations of uninsured or undocumented 
Californians such as the 198,000 undocumented individuals living in San Diego 
County, roughly 6.5 percent of the total population)161 stagger under county 
indigent expenses.  This paradox only serves to emphasize the truism that 
California is simultaneously our richest state and our poorest state.162   
 This means that for Medicaid expansion to be funded in California, the 
counties will have to transfer money to the state.163  Fearful of bankrolling 
Medicaid expansion for the working poor while still being left to serve the merely 
poor and definitively undocumented, the counties resisted.164  In sum, this was the 
issue that Governor Jerry Brown negotiated with the counties in order to fund 
Medicaid expansion.165  
B. What Will Happen on January 1, 2014? 
 In some places, the bridge to January 1, 2014 is already being built – not just 
the obvious example of Massachusetts,166 but in groups like the 500,000 early 
Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in California.167   
 
161. See Morgan Lee, Estimated 198,000 Illegal Immigrants in SD County, THE SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIBUNE (July 20, 2011, 3:10PM), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/Jul/20/ 
estimated-198000-illegal-immigrants-in-sd-county/ (discussing the number of undocumented 
immigrants living in San Diego). 
162. See DANIEL WEINTRAUB, CAL. HEALTH REPORT, CALIFORNIA IS RICHEST, POOREST 
STATE (2013), available at http://www.healthycal.org/archives/12177 (discussing how California 
is home to more millionaires than any other state, but also “has the highest percentage of its 
population living below the poverty line.”); see also STEVEN P. WALLACE ET AL., UCLA CTR. 
FOR HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, UNDOCUMENTED AND UNINSURED BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE 
CARE FOR IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS 13 (2013), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/ 
~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2013/Aug/1699_Wallace_undocumented_uninsured_
barriers_immigrants_v2.pdf (discussing how “undocumented immigrants will constitute a 
significant proportion of the remaining uninsured population and their concentration in a small 
number of states and localities places an uneven burden on the safety-net facilities in those 
areas.”). 
163. See CAL. BUDGET PROJECT, EXPANDING HORIZONS: KEY FACTS ABOUT THE MEDI-CAL 
PROGRAM AS CALIFORNIA IMPLEMENTS HEALTH CARE REFORM 69 (2013), available at 
http://www.cbp.org/pdfs/2013/130402_Expanding_Horizons.pdf (discussing how much of the 
county’s money should be redirected to the state, for purposes of Medi-Cal expansion). 
164. See Chris Megerian, Gov. Jerry Brown faces off with counties on California budget, L.A. 
TIMES (May 29, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/29/local/la-me-pc-jerry-brown-faces-
off-with-counties-on-budget-20130529 (discussing how counties have resisted Governor Jerry 
Brown’s plans to make counties pay for a significant portion of Medicaid expansion costs). 
165. See id. (discussing how Governor Jerry Brown’s plans are a part of the budget 
negotiations with counties). 
166. See Massachusetts Health Care Reform: Sex Years Later, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 1, 2 
(2012), available at http://kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/massachusetts-health-care-reform-six-
years-later/ (discussing Massachusetts’ now seven-year-old experiment with state specific health 
care reform). 
167. See ELIZABETH C. LYTLE ET AL., UCLA CTR. FOR HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, 
PROMOTING ENROLLMENT OF LOW INCOME HEALTH PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS IN COVERED 
CALIFORNIA (2013), available at http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/healthcare/lihp_covered_ 
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 In October of 2013, the exchanges opened168–and in whatever forms they 
took—the navigators,169 non-navigator assistance personnel,170 and just about every 
other insurance counselor imaginable has experienced the biggest outpouring of 
those in need of insurance counseling we may ever see.171  This is not a failure of 
the ACA in particular but more a function of American health insurance 
illiteracy.172 
 Confusion may mount when Medicaid expands in some places and not in 
others.173  The American public is not aware that a mere state line may separate 
them from government-funded health insurance.174  When this does begin to 
percolate into public consciousness, we will have a natural experiment in border 
effects.  Little is known about how many Americans migrate to attain government-
funded health insurance.175  If there ever were a fact pattern to test that truism, we 
have found it. 
 
ca13.pdf (discussing how “over 500,000 of the newly eligible individuals have enrolled in the 
[Low Income Health Program] since its inception in July of 2011 and will transition to Medi-
Cal…”). 
168. See Open Enrollment Period, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/ 
open-enrollment-period/ (last visited Nov.14, 2013) (noting the exchange’s open enrollment 
period, October 1, 2013 through March 31, 2014). 
169. See Navigator, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/navigator/ (last 
visited Nov.14, 2013) (defining a Navigator as “[a]n individual or organization that's trained and 
able to help consumers, small businesses, and their employees as they look for health coverage 
options through the Marketplace, including completing eligibility and enrollment forms.”). 
170. See In Person Assistance Personnel Program, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/in-person-assistance-personnel-program/ (last visited 
Nov.14, 2013) (describing non-navigator assistance personnel, also called in-person assistance 
personnel, as an “[i]ndividual or organizations that are trained and able to provide help to 
consumers, small businesses, and their employees as they look for health coverage options 
through the Marketplace, including helping them complete eligibility and enrollment forms.”). 
171. See, e.g., Keith Collins et al., Health Exchange Enrollment Falls Short of Target, N.Y. 
TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/10/04/us/opening-week-of-health-exchanges. 
html?_r=0 (last updated Nov. 12, 2013) (displaying the number of consumers that enrolled in state 
exchanges and Medicaid in October). 
172. See Half of U.S. Adults Fail ‘Health Insurance 101,’ Misidentify Common Financial 
Terms in Plans, AM. INST. OF CPAS (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.aicpa.org/press/ 
pressreleases/2013/pages/us-adults-fail-health-insurance-101-aicpa-survey.aspx (finding that the 
majority of Americans are not knowledgeable of financial terms in health insurance plans). 
173. See Jane Bornemeier, Survey Shows Confusion Over Health Care Law but Support for 
Medicaid Expansion, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 30, 2013, 12:01 AM) http://www.nytimes.com/news/ 
affordable-care-act/2013/09/30/survey-shows-confusion-over-health-care-law-but-support-for-
medicaid-expansion/ (noting eighty five percent of adults surveyed did not know their state’s 
decision on Medicaid expansion). 
174. See generally GENEVIEVE KENNEY ET AL., URBAN INST., AWARENESS AND 
PERCEPTIONS OF MEDICAID AND SCHIP AMONG LOW-INCOME FAMILIES WITH UNINSURED 
CHILDREN: FINDINGS FROM 2001 (2004); GENEVIEVE KENNEY ET AL., VARIATION IN MEDICAID 
ELIGIBILITY AND PARTICIPATION AMONG ADULTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT (2012) (discussing health insurance program awareness levels in various states).  
175. Though a certain amount has been revealed about the forced out-migration of some 
populations from one state to another with relatively richer government funded health insurance 
and health benefits. See John Cote, Nevada Could Face Suit For Dumping Patients in California, 
S.F. CHRONICLE (Aug. 20, 2013), available at http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/S-F-sues-
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 The “Why Expand Medicaid?” question is widely discussed in state 
legislatures all over this country.  The answer to that question ultimately depends 
on answers to a few under-discussed subsidiary questions: What is the problem that 
Medicaid seeks to fix?  What does Medicaid do?  What are the health consequences 
of Medicaid enrollment?  What can we learn from the Oregon Medicaid Lottery 
and from the six jurisdiction-expanding Medicaid, that either re-enforces what we 
think we know about Medicaid or that challenges us in our thinking about 
Medicaid?  Finally, will the ACA confront the Medicaid conundrum of rapidly 
increasing enrollment twinned with rapidly decreasing Medicaid reimbursement?  
Will Medicaid survive the ACA? 
V.  THE DIFFERENCE OF MEDICAID 
A.  Has Medicaid Made Any Difference? 
 Quantifying the benefits, if any, of health insurance and particularly 
government-funded health insurance is difficult.  Perhaps the most over-
theorized176 but under-empiricized177 topic in all of health law and policy analysis 
revolves around this difficult question.  The answer to this freighted question colors 
perception on Medicaid expansion, just as perspective on the expansion of 
government-funded health insurance colors perception on the value of health 
insurance, in general, and government-funded health insurance, in particular.  
 Whether expanding Medicaid will improve access to health care and improve 
health outcomes is hotly debated.178  A considerable part of the debate is over 
 
Nevada-for-alleged-patient-dumping-4803450.php (last updated Sept. 12, 2013) (discussing 
allegations that Nevada forced 500 psychiatric patients of a state-run hospital to seek medical 
treatment in neighboring California); DAVID BAUGH AND SHINU VERGHESE, MATHEMATICA 
POLICY RESEARCH, MIGRATION PATTERNS FOR MEDICAID ENROLLEES, 2005–2007 57 (2012) 
(finding that, “[o]verall, only 3.7 percent of all Medicaid enrollees moved across states from 2005 
through 2007.”). 
176. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment, 58 AM. 
ECON. REV. 3, 537–539 (June 1968), available at http://lingli.ccer.edu.cn/ahe2012/Week8/ 
Arrow1968.pdf. 
177. Arguably, the Oregon Medicaid Lottery offers the first natural experiment in random 
assignment to Medicaid coverage needed to assess the benefits, if any, of health insurance since 
the RAND health insurance experiments of the 1970s.  See generally AMY FINKELSTEIN ET AL., 
THE OREGON HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE FIRST YEAR 1 (2011), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17190.pdf (discussing the Oregon Medicaid Lottery 
experiment and its first-year results).  See also Amazing Fact! Science Proves Health Insurance 
Works: Ezra Klein, BLOOMBERG VIEW (July 6, 2011) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-
07/amazing-science-proves-health-insurance-works-commentary-by-ezra-klein.html (discussing 
Oregon’s Medicaid Lottery and the RAND health insurance experiments).  
178. Compare Rachel L. Garfield & Anthony Damico, Medicaid Expansion Under Health 
Reform May Increase Service Use And Improve Access for Low-Income Adults With Diabetes, 31 
HEALTH AFF. 159, 163 (2012), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/31/1/159.long 
(exploring the link between ACA sponsored Medicaid expansion and improved access for 
diabetes treatment), with Megan McArdle & Avik Roy, Why Obama’s Medicaid Expansion Will 
Reduce Health Care Access, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 9, 2012, 4:43 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
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whether Medicaid enrollees – who often attain worse health outcomes than those 
enrolled in commercial health insurance,179 and who sometimes have worse 
outcomes than those without any form of health insurance180—attain relatively poor 
health outcomes because of Medicaid.181 
  In short, we struggle to say whether it is the receipt of  Medicaid itself or 
other variables, such as income levels, educational levels, or health literacy levels, 
that contribute to such poor health outcomes for the Medicaid population.  This 
crucial question is at the center of a long simmering feud over whether expanding 
Medicaid actually reduces access to health care.182  In order to understand this 
argument, it is necessary to understand Medicaid provider reimbursement. 
 Current Medicaid provider reimbursement is based on a system of 
administered pricing—part centralized fee schedule and part individually calibrated 
to the expenses of a particular provider.183  Medicaid’s reimbursement rates, most 
importantly, are considerably lower than those of commercial health insurance184 
and of Medicare.185  Medicaid’s reimbursement rates are set by the Medicaid 
participating rates, subject to final approval by the Secretary of HHS under a 
standard of whether the proposed rates are consistent with the purpose of the 
Medicaid statute.186  The Secretary’s determination of the sufficiency of the state 
fee schedule, once made, is given great deference by the courts.187 
 
business/archive/2012/03/why-obamacares-medicaid-expansion-will-reduce-health-care-access/ 
254275/ (arguing that “patients on Medicaid… do far worse in health outcomes than do those in 
private insurance”). 
179. See Devon Herrick & Linda Gorman, Health Outcomes and Medicaid, MACKINAC 
CENTER (June 21, 2013), http://www.mackinac.org/18790 (discussing the health outcomes of 
Medicaid enrollees compared to those who are privately insured). 
180. See id. (explaining that “academic researchers have found that Medicaid enrollees often 
fare worse than not only patients with private insurance, but also patients with no insurance . . . ”). 
181. See id. (discussing examples where Medicaid enrollees have experienced poor health 
outcomes because of Medicaid). 
182. See Garfield & Damico supra note 178, at 163. 
183. See ELICIA HERZ ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32277, HOW MEDICAID WORKS: 
PROGRAM BASICS 33–35 (2005) (explaining that most states combine fee-for-service (paying a 
provider for a particular service based on state-established rates) and managed care (agreements to 
pay “fixed, prospective, monthly, per-person payment rates”) fee systems for delivering Medicaid 
services). 
184. See Stephen Norton & Stephen Zuckerman, Trends in Medicaid Physician Fees, 1993-
1998, 19 HEALTH AFF. 222, 227 (2000) (stating that Medicaid fees are lower than fees paid by 
private insurers since Medicaid reimbursement rates are lower than Medicare reimbursement 
rates, “which historically has had fees below those offered in private markets”). 
185. See id. (explaining that Medicare fees paid are historically below the fees offered in 
private market). 
186. See Financing & Reimbursement, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-
CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Financing-and-Reimbursement/Financing-and-
Reimbursement.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2013) (explaining that States establish their own rates 
within federal guidelines, which are subject to CMS review “for consistency with the Social 
Security Act and other federal statutes and regulations.”). 
187. See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 132 U.S. 1204, 1210 (2012) (holding that 
since the agency has acted under its authority under the Medicaid Act and is an “expert in the 
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Few actual programs have tested whether the Medicaid fee schedule drives 
reduced health care access for Medicaid beneficiaries as well as the Oregon 
Medicaid Lottery.188  For this reason, a closer look at the conception and operation 
of the Oregon Medicaid Lottery is an important part of understanding Medicaid’s 
relationship, if any, to improved health status. 
1. Oregon’s Medicaid Lottery 
 Oregon’s long history of experimentation and innovation in the Medicaid 
program reached its zenith with the creation of the Oregon Health Plan in the 
1990’s.189  The brainchild of then state senator and now Governor John Kitzhaber, 
the Oregon Health Plan was explicitly designed to offer a thinner, limited, health 
insurance benefit190 to the near poor or working poor.191  
 Using a federal Section 1115 Medicaid waiver,192 Oregon expanded 
Medicaid’s coverage to include a further 132,000 Oregonians by 1995,193 including 
120,000 new members in its first year194 who were otherwise unable to afford 
commercial health insurance, but not formerly poor enough to qualify for 
Medicaid.195  The business cycle turned and by 2004 Oregon no longer took new 
 
statute’s subject matter” and its “decision carries weight, ” “review of agency action requires 
courts to apply certain standards of deference to agency decision-making”). 
188.  See About the Study, OR. HEALTH STUDY, http://oregonhealthstudy.org/about-the-study/ 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2013) (describing how the Oregon Health Plan Lottery “created a once-in-a-
lifetime opportunity to design a randomized controlled trial that measures the impact of health 
insurance.”). 
189. See Thomas Bodenheimer, The Oregon Health Plan—Lessons for the Nation, 337 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 651, 651–52 (1997) (describing Oregon’s success in implementing of the Oregon 
Health Plan, which added over 100,000 uninsured people to the Medicaid program while reducing 
the benefit package). 
190. See OR. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., OREGON HEALTH PLAN: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
3, 15 (2006), available at http://www.oregon.gov/oha/healthplan/DataReportsDocs/ 
Oregon%20Health%20Plan%20-%20An%20historical%20overview.pdf (stating that Senate 
President John Kitzhaber initiated the Oregon Medicaid Priority Setting Project, which led to the 
development of the Prioritized List of Health Services that made funding available for the Oregon 
Health Plan (OHP) to expand coverage to more individuals—this “Prioritized List” is a limited list 
of covered services, which placed more limits on health insurance benefits). 
191. See id. at 1, 15 (explaining that OHP was formed to cover a limited “Prioritized List of 
Health Services” for an “expanded OHP population,” of those who “didn’t qualify for public 
assistance (Medicaid), were not insured by an employer, and couldn’t afford individual 
coverage”). 
192. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1315 (Supp. V 2006) (providing for waiver of state 
plan requirements particularly in “the case of any experimental, pilot, or demonstration project”).  
193. See Alan Katz, The Oregon Health Insurance Lottery, ALAN KATZ HEALTH CARE 
REFORM BLOG (Mar. 4, 2008), http://alankatz.wordpress.com/2008/03/04/the-oregon-health-
insurance-lottery/. 
194. See Joe Rojas-Burke, How Federal Health Care Reform Will Affect People in Oregon, 
OREGONIAN (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.oregonlive.com/health/index.ssf/2010/03/ 
how_federal_health_care_reform.html (stating that “the Oregon Health Plan extended Medicaid 
coverage to 120,000 additional residents” in 1994).  
195. See OREGON HEALTH PLAN: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 190, at 1, 13 
(explaining that OHP’s purpose was to make health care available to thousands of people who did 
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enrollees in the Oregon Health Plan.196  Expanding coverage—even limited 
coverage—in this way was extraordinarily expensive.197  By 2008, Oregon’s 
uninsured numbers crept back to pre-Oregon Health Plan levels.198  As spots 
opened in the continuing Oregon Health Plan, Oregon’s inventiveness in deciding 
how to allocate the scarce benefit was expressed in the decision to allocate 3,000 
open spots by lottery.199  Thus, the Oregon Health Insurance Lottery was born. 
 Oregon’s then 600,000 uninsured were invited to apply to enter a lottery for 
10,000 open spots in the Oregon Health Plan.200  More than 80,000 Oregonians 
chose to participate in the lottery.201  The requirements for entry into the lottery 
were simply that one not previously be eligible for health insurance and that the 
applicant be “working age” – or between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five, have 
less than $2,000 in assets, and have an income below the federal poverty line.202  
Not a great deal is known about the 80,000 lottery participants as compared with 
the total 600,000 uninsured.203  It is a mistake to assume that the 80,000 lottery 
participants represented a cross-section of Oregon’s 2004 uninsured.204  But it is 
fair to say that each lottery participant represents an individual who either thought 
 
not qualify for Medicaid, even though their incomes were below the poverty line). 
196. See id. at 10 (stating that “OHP Standard closed to new enrollment effective July 1, 
2004”). 
197. See Eric Fruits et al., The Oregon Health Plan, A “Bold Experiment” That Failed, 
CASCADE POLICY INST. 13 (2010) available at http://cascadepolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/Oregon_Health_Plan_-_The_Bold_Experiment_That_Failed.pdf (stating 
that under the OHP, demand for health insurance exceeded Oregon’s ability to pay, and discussing 
the failures of the OHP, including the program’s inability to maintain fiscal sustainability and 
control costs). 
198. See Anne S. Kimbol, Oregon’s Health Coverage Lottery – An Equitable Distribution 
Method or a Sign that We Have Given Up, HEALTH LAW PERSPS. (2008), available at 
http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2008/%28AK%29%20Oregon.pdf  (stating that 
Oregon’s uninsured population was roughly 600,000 in 2008).  When Oregon initiated the OHP, 
the state’s uninsured population was roughly 500,000.  See JEANENE SMITH ET AL., OFFICE FOR 
OR. HEALTH POLICY AND RESEARCH, TRENDS IN OREGON’S HEALTHCARE MARKET AND THE 
OREGON HEALTH PLAN: A REPORT TO THE 74TH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 21 (2007), available at 
http://www.oregon.gov/oha/OHPR/RSCH/docs/Trends/2007_LegisTrendsReport.pdf (stating that 
when  “Oregon initiated . . . the Oregon Health Plan . . . 18% of Oregon’s 2.85 million population 
was uninsured”). 
199. See id. (describing the lottery systems as a reservation list for the newly available slots in 
the OHP opened during late January and through February of 2008 from which there were a few 
thousands slots to be filled by a lottery-style drawing). 
200. See id. (explaining that Oregon developed a lottery system “[i]nstead of attempting to use 
tight eligibility requirements or a first-come-first-serve basis of allocating the new policies”). 
201. Id.  
202. See id. (discussing the OHP lottery eligibility requirements). 
203. See Loren Heal, Study of Oregon Medicaid Program Reveals No Significant Health 
Improvements, HEARTLANDER (May 28, 2013), http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-
article/2013/05/28/study-oregon-medicaid-program-reveals-no-significant-health-improvement 
(explaining that the study’s participants that “had self-selected to be on Medicaid by signing up 
for a waiting list . . . may differ as a group from people who were eligible but did not apply to be 
in the program” because those who participated in the lottery might have been “sicker or more 
interested in obtaining health care”). 
204. Id. 
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they knew—or had an advocate who thought they knew—that enrollment in 
government-funded insurance is of value.  This assumption that the acquisition of 
enrollment in The Oregon Health Plan would mean something good for the enrollee 
may be what distinguishes the population of lottery entrants from the rest of the 
uninsured; this was the first step in the pursuit of something of value. 
 This assumption deserves scrutiny precisely because it represents the self-
selection of a group diametrically opposed to the idea that enrollment in 
government-funded health insurance is worse than no health insurance at all.205  
The Oregon lottery entrants, in short, were pre-disposed to believe that there would 
be a positive correlation between health insurance and health status; whether this 
was the product of previous episodes of enrollment in government-funded health 
insurance or the product of optimism bias or something else entirely is unclear.  It 
is also uncertain whether individuals with pent up health needs were more likely to 
enroll in the lottery, potentially skewing the results about the relationship between 
lottery winners to enrollees seeking  health care utilization in the early stages of 
enrollment.  It is hard to say whether the lottery enrollees were seeking the peace of 
mind found in health insurance enrollment against inchoate future need, or whether 
they were pursuing coverage for a particular long-deferred procedure or treatment.  
Stated differently, we do not know if people seek government funded insurance for 
protection from the risk of financial devastation from serious illness or whether 
they seek government funded insurance to satisfy a particular health need.  
Understanding Medicaid beneficiary motivation would tell us something about 
utilization patterns as well as persistence of enrollment in government funded 
health insurance. 
 Even the degree of commitment between and among lottery participants was 
variable.  A full 16,000 lottery participants had to be pulled out of the lottery to fill 
the 10,000 slots.206  Some of those chosen were no longer eligible, some no longer 
alive, and some no longer reachable.207  Low income individuals often lack the 
employment and housing stability that make follow up on months-earlier lottery 
enrollment easy.208  A case could be made, as a result, that the lottery created a 
group of participants  particularly motivated to achieve insured status and further 
 
205. See generally Randall Olson, Self-Selection Bias, SAGE RESEARCH METHODS, 
http://srmo.sagepub.com/view/encyclopedia-of-survey-research-methods/n526.xml (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2013) (describing self-selection bias).  
206. AMY FINKELSTEIN ET AL., WHAT IS THE LINK BETWEEN HAVING HEALTH INSURANCE 
AND ENJOYING BETTER HEALTH AND FINANCES? EARLY RESULTS OF THE OREGON HEALTH 
INSURANCE EXPERIMENT, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. 6 (2012), http://www.rwjf.org/ 
content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2012/rwjf72145.  
207. See id. at 10 (explaining why some individuals were no longer eligible to participate in 
the lottery). 
208. See Poverty, Housing Insecurity and Student Transiency in Rural Areas, PENN STATE 
COLL. OF EDUC., http://www.ed.psu.edu/educ/crec/research/poverty (last visited Nov. 15 2013) 
(discussing the high frequency of residential mobility that households below the poverty level 
experience in comparison with the rest of the population). 
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focused that group to include those most likely to organize their lives in a way that 
enabled them to capitalize on insured status.  Thus refined, the group that moved to 
Oregon Health Plan enrollment insured status was a collection of able-bodied, 
uninsured, low-income adults who affirmatively wanted health insurance.209 
 On a track roughly parallel to the winnowing of Oregon’s uninsured to a 
group of 10,000 new Oregon Health Plan enrollees, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology’s Amy Finkelstein and her research group decided to study the new 
enrollees—both in the absolute and relative to a cohort of lottery losers.210  Their 
questions: What does having Medicaid mean for health utilization and health 
outcomes for new enrollees and compared with the non-enrolled comparison 
group?211  Is having Medicaid coverage better or worse than having no coverage at 
all?212 
 Evidence from the first year indicates that one year after enrollment, 
individuals both selected from Medicaid coverage and those who elected to pursue 
Medicaid coverage had better self-reported physical health, mental health, and 
access to care than those in the non-selected and non-enrolled control group.213  
Specifically, those in the lottery enrolled group were twenty-five percent more 
likely to report their health as good, very good or excellent and ten percent more 
likely to screen negative for depression.214 
 The improvement in self-reported health status came at a price.  The lottery 
enrolled group increased their use of health care services, including increased 
probability of prescription drug use, preventive care use, and increased use of 
outpatient provider visits.215    
 Although the data is just beginning to become public, the Oregon Health 
Study Group’s conclusions ignited a firestorm of debate about even early 
conclusions.216  It may be that there has not been a randomized controlled 
experiment on the effect of insurance on health outcomes in several decades.217  It 
 
209. FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 206, at 2. 
210. See id. at 1–2 (explaining the statistical procedure used to evaluate the results of 
Oregon’s health insurance experiment). 
211. See id. at 1–2 (explaining the study’s analysis is focused on the cost of increased health 
care utilization and benefits of health insurance on health). 
212. See id. (explaining that the article compares those selected from the lottery with those 
that were not in order to estimate the impact of insurance coverage). 
213. See id. at 3 (finding that one year after enrollment in the health program, those selected 
by the lottery have benefited from the coverage in comparison to those that were unable to apply 
for Medicaid). 
214. Id. at 27. 
215. See id. at 3 (finding that those selected by the lottery were more likely to take 
prescription drugs, utilize outpatient visits, and comply with recommended preventive care). 
216. See Harold Pollack, Oregon Medicaid Experiment “is a Rorschach test of people’s views 
of the ACA”, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (May 4, 2013, 8:00 AM), 
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/oregon-medicaid-experiment-is-a-rorschach-test-of-
peoples-views-of-the-aca/ (“Wednesday’s New England Journal of Medicine article on the 
Oregon Medicaid lottery has provoked a firestorm reaction”). 
217. See Aviva Aron-Dine et al., The RAND Health Insurance Experiment, Three Decades 
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may also be that the first year data from the Oregon Health Study Group questions 
some of the perceived wisdom of the RAND Corporation’s Health Insurance 
Experiment (HIE).218  
 HIE’s decades old conclusions have long been perceived wisdom.219  
Positions have hardened in light of the HIE study’s conclusions.220  Reputations 
have been made in reliance on the HIE study’s conclusions.221  And the HIE 
study’s conclusion cemented philosophical perspectives into place.222 
 The Oregon Health Study Group’s conclusions, as a result, are potentially 
disruptive.  The lack of study on the empirical question of whether Medicaid 
expansion improves health status may be the least empiricized, but most highly 
theorized, question in all of health law and policy. 
 Compared to the uninsured control group, the Oregon Medicaid lottery 
enrolled received sixty percent more mammograms, twenty percent more 
cholesterol checks, forty-five percent more pap smears for women, thirty-five 
percent more outpatient care, and thirty percent more hospital based care.223  The 
enrolled lottery winners chose to consume more health care, once they had lower 
out-of-pocket medical expenditures and medical debt,224 just as the newly insured 
have long been tracked to bump up health care consumption.225  And, even over the 
span of only one year, they self-reported better health—much of it attributable to 
better mental health.226 
  Though it is yet unclear whether the reported improved mental health status 
resulted from either or both improved health care access or reduced financial 
pressure from health care costs, it is remarkable how quickly improved mental 
health status was ruled by some as beyond the ken of improved health status.227  
 
Later, 27 J.  ECON. PERSPS 197, 198 n.1 (2013) (discussing the only two randomized health 
insurance experiments done in the United States since the RAND Health Insurance Experiment). 
218. See id. at 220 (discussing RAND’s rejection of the notion that medical spending “does 
not respond to out-of-pocket price”). 
219. See id. (discussing the solidification of the RAND experiment results “in the minds of a 
generation of health economists and policymakers”). 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 206, at 3, 23. 
224. See id. at 3 (discussing the results of those selected by the lottery after one year of 
enrollment).  
225. See Daniel Polsky, How the Newly Insured Use Health Services: a Lesson for the U.S. 
from Medicare, 17 LDI ISSUE BRIEF (Jan. 2012), http://ldihealtheconomist.com/media/ 
how_the_newly_insured_use_health_services.pdf (discussing the increase of health care 
consumption observed when previously uninsured individuals receive coverage under Medicare). 
226. See FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 206, 3–4 (finding that individuals enrolled in the 
Oregon Health Plan reported improvements in physical and mental health). 
227. Compare Avik Roy, Oregon Study: Medicaid ‘Had No Significant Effect’ On Health 
Outcomes vs. Being Uninsured, FORBES.COM, THE APOTHECARY BLOG (May 2, 2013, 4:20 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2013/05/02/oregon-study-medicaid-had-no-
significant-effect-on-health-outcomes-vs-being-uninsured/ (discussing the significant increase in 
utilizing health care to diagnose and treat depression in Oregon’s Medicaid experiment) with 
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Perhaps this is because mental health is notoriously difficult to quantify, sometimes 
not seen as health at all, and because the same self-reported improvements in 
depression might be attributable to the sheer force of income transfer, something 
that could be accomplished outside of expanded Medicaid.228  In other words, it 
may be that Medicaid does improve health status, but so might other more cost 
effective interventions.229 
B. Will Medicaid Expansion Make Any Difference? 
 The immediate challenge before the states will be to determine whether 
Medicaid expansion under the ACA is gift or Trojan horse.  This may take a while.  
The rollout of original Medicaid tells us this.230  Although eleven states were all in 
on original Medicaid by 1967, New York was kicking around legislation that same 
year calling for Medicaid’s repeal.231  Still, eight more states were onboard by 
1970, almost all participating within four years, though Arizona (the final hold out) 
was not onboard until 1982.232  Texas considered exiting the Medicaid program as 
recently as 2010, but did not.233 
 
Jonathan Cohn, What Oregon Really Told Us About Medicaid, NEW REPUBLIC, (May 13, 2012), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113195/oregon-medicaid-study-good-bad-and-ugly 
(discussing the possibility that better mental health might be related to decreased stress over 
paying medical bills) and Marianne Udow- Phillips, Oregon Medicaid study shows value of 
investment in mental health, BRIDGE, (May 12, 2013), http://bridgemi.com/2013/05/oregon-
medicaid-study-shows-value-of-investment-in-mental-health/ (discussing how commentators have 
ignored the studies findings of improved mental health and have labeled the experiment as 
showing no significant health benefits). 
228. See Mental Health and Stress-Related Disorders, NAT’L INST. OF ENVL. HEALTH SCIS., 
http://www.niehs.nih.gov/research/programs/geh/climatechange/health_impacts/mental_health/ 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2013) (discussing the difficulty in quantifying mental health concerns); Roy, 
supra note 227 (explaining the reported improvements in mental health and reduced financial 
strain). 
229. See Roy, supra note 227 (arguing that although there is the possibility that Medicaid may 
show a benefit relative to those that are uninsured, there may be less expensive alternatives). 
230. See OLSON, supra note 36.  
231. Id. 
232. Id. 
233. TEXAS HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. COMM’N & TEXAS DEP’T OF INS., IMPACT ON 
TEXAS IF MEDICAID IS ELIMINATED 32 (Dec. 2010), http://www.hhsc.state.tx.us/hb-
497_122010.pdf (weighing the costs and benefits of opting out of the Medicaid system). Of 
course, whether this latest decision by Texas not to exit Medicaid all together is the latest 
expression of Texan autonomy or the fullest expression of economic coercion is difficult to 
characterize after NFIB. See MUSUMECI, supra note 18, at 1 (reporting that Texas was one of 
twenty-five states to join a Florida lawsuit attempting to prohibit the government from coercing 
states to join in Medicaid expansion by withholding all federal Medicaid funding from states that 
failed to comply with expansion guidelines). The Supreme Court would eventually hold the 
federal government could withhold the Affordable Care Act Medicaid expansion funds from states 
failing to meet Medicaid expansion guidelines. Id. at 7.  
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Given Arizona Governor Janice Brewer’s relative haste to be all-in on 
Medicaid expansion this time out of the gate,234 there may be lessons to be learned 
from Arizona’s journey to participation in original Medicaid. 
1. Arizona and the Cost of Uncompensated Care 
 Arizona’s interest in original Medicaid participation seems to have roughly 
correlated with the exponential growth in indigent care costs born by the state, 
rising from $50 million in 1974 to $125 million in 1980.235  Although Arizona in 
the mid-1960s was insulated from the indigent care costs of some its poorest 
citizens because those same individuals were then eligible for free or reduced price 
care through the federally funded Indian Health Service,236 these were significant 
numbers nonetheless.   
 Financial exigency, coupled with the argument that Arizonans were still taxed 
for the program in which they chose not to participate, seems to have ruled the 
day.237 The history of original Medicaid buy-in thus strongly suggests that, 
eventually, the aversion to tax payment funding of benefits programs for citizens of 
other states may drive movement toward participation in ACA-expanded Medicaid.  
But these pressures dominate only at timescales of decades. 
2. The Chicken or the Egg: Medicaid and Health Outcomes 
 Medicaid beneficiaries are, by definition, lower income individuals.238  And 
they present Medicaid providers with all of the disproportionately complex health 
 
234. See Ronald Brownstein, Why the GOPs Resistance to Medicaid Expansion is Eroding, 
NAT’L J. (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/political-connections/why-the-
gop-s-resistance-to-medicaid-expansion-is-eroding-20130207 (noting Governor Jan Brewer’s 
January of 2013 State of the State pronouncement that Arizona should join the ACA’s expansion 
of Medicaid). 
235. See Sarah Kliff, Six Governors Say They Will Opt Out of Medicaid. How Long Will They 
Hold Out?, WASH. POST (July 9, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/ 
2012/07/09/six-governors-say-they-will-opt-out-of-medicaid-how-long-will-they-hold-
out/?print=1 (stating that Arizona was the final state to join Medicaid in 1982, and did so because 
of dramatic rise in cost of indigent health care). 
236. Mark Trahant, The Indian Health Service Paradox, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sep. 16, 
2009), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Columns/2009/September/091709Trahant.aspx (stating 
the Indian Health Services was formed in 1955 with the primary mission of providing health care 
to Native American and Alaskan Natives).  
237. See Suzy Khimm, Will States Really Turn Down Federal Money? They’ve Done It 
Before, WASH. POST (June 29, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/ 
06/29/will-states-really-turn-down-federal-money-theyve-done-it-before/ (stating Arizona 
eventually adopted Medicaid due to rising health care costs, county government officials’ anger 
with the state for failing to take advantage of federal health care funding, and critics calls that 
Arizona citizens were sending tax dollars to other states to subsidize health care without receiving 
any federal funding in return).  
238. Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i) 
(Supp. 2013). 
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problems of lower income Americans.239  More importantly, Medicaid beneficiaries 
present Medicaid providers with the fallout from all of the complex life problems 
that accompany low socio-economic status in the United States.240 
 The debate over whether Medicaid eligibility improves health status is really 
two intertwined debates.  The first is over whether Medicaid eligibility improves 
health access.241  The second is over whether improved health access via Medicaid 
improves health status.242  Since the relationship between improved health access 
and health status is complex, it is important not to conflate them.243  In short, these 
are both stories with supply and demand driven dimensions.  How we understand 
them tells us something about how we conceive of the role of human agency and 
choice in health status. 
C. Does Medicaid Eligibility Improve Health Access? 
 Medicaid is the Rorschach test244 of American health care politics. From one 
perspective, characterized as a broken, costly system in desperate need of reform, 
or even abolition, and from the other viewed as one of the more successful parts of 
the War on Poverty245—so successful that its expansion sits at the center of the 
ACA.  The politics of Medicaid whipsaw between these two competing visions. 
 Although this article follows the popular usage of “Medicaid” as a universal 
moniker for the federal-state funded program of health insurance for the poor and 
the disabled, Medicaid is no absolute monolith.246  In addition to representing fifty 
 
239. See Low Income Working Families Facts and Figures, URBAN INST. 2 (Aug. 2005), 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/900832.pdf (finding that low-income working families are 
more likely to have health problems than middle-income families). 
240. See R. J. Blendon, et al., Medicaid Beneficiaries and Health Reform, 12 HEALTH AFF. 
132, 135 (1993) (finding many Medicaid beneficiaries have a difficult time affording the basic 
necessities for life, including food, clothing, shelter, and have serious concerns about being able to 
pay medical bills even with the assistance of Medicaid).  
241. See Katherine Baicker & Amy Finkelstein, The Effects of Medicaid Coverage – Learning 
From the Oregon Experiment, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 683, 683 (2011) (stating there has been 
much debate over Medicaid because some believe “it pays providers so little that beneficiaries 
have trouble gaining access to care”). 
242. See ECON. RESEARCH INITIATIVE ON THE UNINSURED, JUMPING TO CONCLUSIONS: 
WILL EXPANDING HEALTH CARE INSURANCE IMPROVE THE HEALTH OF THE UNINSURED? (Mar. 
2003), http://www.rwjf-eriu.org/pdf/research-highlight-mar.pdf (stating hundreds of studies have 
demonstrated that people without health insurance face worse health outcomes, but questioning if 
that is enough to conclude that access to insurance would improve the health of the uninsured). 
243. See, e.g., Katherine Baicker et al., The Oregon Experiment – Effects of Medicaid on 
Clinical Outcomes, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1713, 1716 (2013) (finding Medicaid coverage did not 
significantly lower measures of blood pressure, cholesterol, glycated hemoglobin, or significantly 
reduce the risk of a cardio vascular event, such as heart attack or congestive heart failure). 
244. See THE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY 512 (Bonnie Ruth Strickland et al. eds., 
2nd ed. 2003) (discussing the Rorschach Test, a projective test consisting of ten cards, each 
containing an inkblot, designed to allow subjects to interpret the inkblots in a way that gives 
insight into subjects personality).  
245. OLSON, supra note 36.  
246. LAURA SNYDER ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID 
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different variations, this program may also continue to draw distinctions between 
existing Medicaid beneficiaries and Medicaid expansion beneficiaries based on 
different coverage of U.S. Preventive Services Task Force A and B rated 
services.247  When all the dust settles, previously enrolled Medicaid beneficiaries 
may have a different kind of Medicaid coverage from expansion Medicaid 
beneficiaries, in the realm of preventive services, for example.248 
 Similarly, implementation of Medicaid managed care is unevenly distributed 
throughout the country.249  And the effectiveness of Medicaid managed care 
implementation varies throughout the country—dependent on finance, 
demographics, Medicaid oversight, the robustness of provider panels, and a state’s 
experience in contracting with managed care entities.250 
 Even when painting with a broad brush, it is difficult to test whether Medicaid 
beneficiaries would be better off with no health insurance at all because few 
Medicaid beneficiaries seem likely to consent to uninsured status voluntarily.  
Medicaid beneficiaries, in short, appear to view Medicaid enrollment as something 
beneficial.251  As a proxy calculation for the value of Medicaid enrollment, some 
 
AND THE UNINSURED - WHY DOES MEDICAID SPENDING VARY ACROSS STATES: A CHART BOOK 
OF FACTORS DRIVING STATE SPENDING (2012), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files. 
wordpress.com/2013/01/8378.pdf (stating that states have significant flexibility to expand 
Medicaid programs within their state, resulting in wide variations from state to state). 
247. See Sara E. Wilensky & Elizabeth A. Gray, Existing Medicaid Beneficiaries Left Off The 
Affordable Care Act’s Prevention Bandwagon, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1188, 1189 (2013) (stating that 
newly eligible Medicaid beneficiaries will be eligible for grade A and B services, while those 
currently enrolled in Medicaid will follow traditional Medicaid rules and may not be eligible for A 
and B rated services). 
248. See Wilensky & Gray, supra note 247, at 1189 (stating that because the new health 
reform law treats the newly eligible and those already receiving Medicaid differently, it is possible 
that newly eligible beneficiaries may be eligible for different preventative services than those 
already receiving Medicaid). 
249. See Robert Hurley & Stephen Zuckerman, Medicaid Managed Care: State Flexibility in 
Action 11–12 (Urban Inst., Mar. 2002) available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/ 
ACF1AAA.pdf (noting that the extent to which states have implemented Medicaid managed care 
plans has been widely uneven, varying from states that have almost fully converted Medicaid into 
a pre-paid managed care plan, to other states which adopted very few managed care programs and 
still rely on the traditional Medicaid administrative structure). 
250. Jenni Bergal, Kentucky’s Rush Into Medicaid Managed Care: A Cautionary Tale for 
Other States, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 15, 2013), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/ 
2013/july/14/kentucky-medicad-managed-care.aspx?referrer=search (reporting that patients in 
Kentucky have experienced problems since the state switched to a managed care plan).  Debra 
Lipson, a senior researcher at Mathematica Policy Research, stated, “The Kentucky case is a 
harbinger of what can happen when states don’t allow enough time and devote sufficient resources 
to strengthen the Medicaid agency’s oversight capacity and systems—or develop strong contracts 
and care monitoring systems from scratch if they haven’t contracted with managed care plans 
before.”  Id. 
251. See DANIELLE YOUNG ET AL., CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE RESEARCH & 
TRANSFORMATION, COVER MICHIGAN SURVEY 2013: SATISFACTION WITH HEALTH CARE 
COVERAGE 2 (2013) (finding that survey recipients of Medicaid were the most satisfied of any 
group of insurance recipients surveyed, and the most concerned of any group with losing their 
benefits). 
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have compared Medicaid beneficiary health status with the health status of the non-
Medicaid enrolled uninsured.252  The trouble with this is that the studies do not, and 
cannot, account for the possible pre-disposition of the sickest uninsured to seek out 
Medicaid enrollment.253  It is hard to factor in the likelihood that the Medicaid 
population may be sicker than the general uninsured population or, phrased 
differently, that the sicker subset of the uninsured population may be the most 
motivated and persistent seekers of Medicaid enrollment.254  Even adjusting for 
severity mix, it is hard to know how much adjustment for severity mix is 
appropriate when comparing Medicaid enrolled and uninsured populations.255 
 If the uninsured are better off than Medicaid beneficiaries, after all, we would 
have to explain exactly why we have Medicaid.  If expanding Medicaid reduces 
access to health care256 we would have to explain why we have non-expansion or 
original Medicaid.  And if the uninsured are better off than Medicaid beneficiaries, 
we would have to explain why we do not dedicate valuable government funding to 
duplicating for the Medicaid population those identifiable things that make the 
uninsured better off, such as better access to health care charity care.  What Aaron 
Carroll and Harold Pollack have described as the “wide . . . debate over whether 
Medicaid helps or hurts its own recipients”257 continues—in expanded format – in 
the states still debating ACA Medicaid expansion258 but with an even greater 
 
252. See John Holahan, Health Status and the Cost of Expanding Insurance Coverage, 20 
HEALTH AFF. 279, 280 (2001) (studying  the differences in health status between those on 
Medicaid and the uninsured). 
253. See Jonathan Cohn, Attention Conservatives: Yes, Medicaid Works, NEW REPUBLIC (July 
7, 2011), http://www.newrepublic.com/blog/jonathan-cohn/91538/medicaid-works-health-oregon-
lottery-finkelstein-gruber-newhouse# (stating that when comparing people with Medicaid to 
people without insurance there is no way to account for differences between the populations, such 
as whether people suffering from a major medical condition are more likely to sign up for public 
insurance rather than remain uninsured). 
254. See Austin Frakt et al., Our Flawed but Beneficial Medicaid Program, 364 NEW ENG. J. 
MED e31(1), e31(2) (April 21, 2011) (stating that Medicaid beneficiaries are, as a whole, sicker, 
poorer, and with less access to resources when compared against the uninsured). 
255. See Baicker & Finkelstein, supra note 241, at 683 (noting it is difficult to compare 
Mediaid enrollees against the uninsured because of the many differences between the two groups, 
including baseline health status). 
256. See Avik Roy, New Study: Expanding Medicaid Reduces Access to Health Care, 
FORBES.COM, THE APOTHECARY BLOG (Mar. 10, 2012, 6:57 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
aroy/2012/03/10/new-study-expanding-medicaid-reduces-access-to-health-care/ (describing 
various studies demonstrating that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion has the potential to reduce 
access to physicians). 
257. Aaron Carroll & Harold Pollack, Expanding Medicaid saved lives, THE INCIDENTAL 
ECONOMIST (July 26, 2012, 8:28 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/expanding-
medicaid-saved-lives/. 
258. See id. (discussing how a number of states have recently used the “‘questionable’” 
quality of Medicaid to fortify their arguments against expansion); see also State Participation in 
the Affordable Care Act’s Expansion of Medicaid Eligibility, COMMONWEALTH FUND (July 
2013), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Maps-and-Data/Medicaid-Expansion-Map.aspx 
(identifying states that may have a continuing debate about Medicaid expansion as evidenced by 
their rejection of the ACA Medicaid expansion plan). 
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urgency.259  After all, if Medicaid hurts its own recipients, subsidized exchange 
purchased health insurance will do the same.260  Should all non-open market 
purchased health insurance—even if purchased at commercial market rates in a 
structured commercial market place—be inherently suspect as bad for the health 
outcome enrollees?  If so, we must consider whether it is the nature of the enrollees 
or the nature of the utilization of non-market acquired coverage or something else 
entirely that makes it suspect. 
 The striking thing about these debates is they are both old and new again, as 
well as for how they occur in an apparent vacuum.261  We have been expanding 
Medicaid incrementally for decades,262 however, and should be able to learn some 
things from the morbidity and mortality data surrounding these earlier 
expansions.263  Sommers, Baicker, and Epstein have compared all-cause mortality 
rates of working-age childless adults between 2000 and 2005 in three states—
Arizona, Maine, and New York—with these same states before and after expansion 
as well comparison non-expansion states.264  Estimating a 6.1 percent reduction in 
relative risk of death among adults,265 the authors note an estimated reduced 
mortality risk in line with population-level reductions in infant and child mortality 
associated with Medicaid expansions involving these populations in the 1980s.266  
 
259. See Noam N. Levey, Medicaid Has Mixed Record On Improving Health For Poor, Study 
Says, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/01/news/la-pn-medicaid-
mixed-record-improving-health-20130501 (“The Medicaid debate has taken on new urgency as 
the Obama administration pushes states to take advantage of the 2010 Affordable Care Act”). 
260. This is more than a rhetorical question because it addresses the problem of moral hazard 
as well as the reality that high-deductible health insurance, structured to discourage use of health 
care, may be affirmatively harmful to the health of the insured. See Walecia Konrad, The Many 
Hidden Costs of High-Deductible Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/30/health/30patient.html (explaining how beneficiaries with low 
incomes are discouraged from using their health insurance because they cannot afford the high 
cost-sharing requirements that must be met before the insurance begins sharing or covering the 
cost of services). 
261. See, e.g., Dayna Bowen Matthew, The “New Federalism”Approach to Medicaid: 
Empirical Evidence That Ceding Inherently Federal Authority to the States Harms Public Health, 
90 KY. L.J 973, 976–78, 996–98 (2001-2002) (discussing the Bush administration’s new Medicaid 
rules giving more power to the states to control their Medicaid programs and the possible 
reduction in access to health care for beneficiaries as a result). 
262. See Medicaid’s Milestones, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., available at 
http://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/History/index.html?redirect=/History/ (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2013) (showing a timeline of amendments and expansions to Medicaid since its 
enactment in 1965). 
263. See Benjamin D. Sommers, et al., Mortality and Access to Care among Adults After State 
Medicaid Expansions, 367 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 11, 1032–34 (Sept. 13, 2012) (discussing the 
findings of a study that examined the mortality rates in states with expanded Medicaid, finding 
that expansion was associated with reduced mortality as well as improved health care coverage, 
access to care, and self-reported health). 
264. See id. at 1026 (comparing these three states with neighboring states, selected as 
“controls”, which did not have Medicaid expansion). 
265. Id. at 1028.  
266. Id. at 1026.  
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The costs of earlier Medicaid expansions for children and pregnant women could 
even be estimated and extrapolated to current dollars.267  
 In light of the paucity of data on the actual health effects of Medicaid 
enrollment, the rhetorical certainty on both sides is surprising.  The assertion that 
“Republican governors who have refused the expansion know full well that they 
are . . . hurting their own low-income residents”268 as well as its polar opposite 
claim that  “physicians even do better caring for the uninsured than they do caring 
for Medicaid patients”269 both assume what is not known at present.  Given the 
paucity of actual research on the question of the actual health effects of Medicaid 
enrollment, it is difficult to assess the veracity of either assertion.  Effects on 
depression and family income aside, there have not been the kinds of studies to 
produce definitive answers to these questions. 
D. Does Medicaid Coverage Improve Health Access? 
 Even the fundamental question of whether Medicaid enrollment improves 
health care access is really two-dimensional.  Enrollment may improve access to 
Medicaid, as well as improve access to providers.  The relationship between 
Medicaid enrollment and access is tricky both because enrollment is not the same 
as utilization and because Medicaid take-up rates are notoriously difficult to 
predict.270  A number of Medicaid enrollees do not use eligibility in any kind of 
comprehensive way.271  Whether this is because of lack of access to providers or 
preference to reserve Medicaid eligibility for catastrophic health care coverage 
alone is, in and of itself, hard to project.   What is known is that a percentage of 
Medicaid beneficiaries also use other forms of access to indigent health care, and 
that a percentage of individuals using other forms of indigent health are potentially 
eligible for Medicaid enrollment.272  It is also significant that some distinct groups 
 
267. See Carroll & Pollack, supra note 257 (discussing a study analyzing the health impacts 
and costs associated with earlier Medicaid expansion and expressing these findings in 2012 
dollars). 
268. David Firestone, Rick Scott Accepts Reality, TAKING NOTE, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2013, 
1:47 PM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/rick-scott-accepts-reality/. 
269. Roy, supra note 256. 
270. See Chapin White, A Comparison of Two Approaches to Increasing Access to Care: 
Expanding Coverage versus Increasing Physician Fees, 47 HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH 963, 979 
(2012) (finding that coverage expansion does not necessarily mean an increase or decrease in 
utilization); see also Ben Sommers et al., Understanding Participation Rates in Medicaid: 
Implications for the Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS OFFICE 
OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION  ISSUE BRIEF (Mar. 2012), 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2012/medicaidtakeup/ib.shtm (discussing the many variables 
that effect calculating “take-up” rates). 
271. See Medicaid in Colorado: How Enrollees Access and Use Health Care, THE 
COLORADO TRUST 5–6, 8 (Jan. 2013), http://www.cohealthaccesssurvey.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/CHAS_MedicaidBrief_v.pdf (discussing how fourteen percent of 
Medicaid enrollees, double that of those commercially insured, reported that they did not see 
doctors for needed care because of cost). 
272. See id. at 3–4 (discussing where Medicaid beneficiaries receive care, other than at 
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of pregnant women are or will be eligible for either or both Medicaid and 
commercial insurance purchased through the exchange in their state, primarily 
because pregnancy-related Medicaid coverage is excluded from the definition of 
minimum essential coverage.273 
 Physician acceptance of new Medicaid patients varies.274  In California, for 
example, Medi-Cal beneficiaries are nearly twice as likely as other insured adults to 
report difficulty in obtaining an outpatient doctor’s appointment.275  This difficulty 
is consistent across specialty physician outpatient appointments, as well as primary 
care providers.276  Federal Medicare guidelines attempt to forestall this by advising 
a ratio of sixty to eighty primary care providers for every 100,000 Medi-Cal 
beneficiaries.277  A 2010 retrospective study at Californian physician participation 
in Medi-Cal tallied fifty primary care providers for every 100,000 Medi-Cal 
beneficiaries.278  The irony of the least sophisticated health care consumers being 
called upon to demonstrate a fairly high level of operational sophistication in 
gaining access to our health care system is not lost on enrollees as well as 
observers.279 
 
traditional physician offices, and explaining that Colorado has the opportunity, through the 
Affordable Care Act, to expand Medicaid to everyone in Colorado who is at or below 133% of the 
federal poverty level); see also Genevieve M. Kenney, Variation in Medicaid Eligibility and 
Participation among Adults: Implications for the Affordable Care Act, 49 Inquiry 3 231, 236 
(2012) (explaining that out of 39 million uninsured nonelderly adults, 11.5 percent, or 4.5 million, 
were eligible for comprehensive Medicaid benefits but not enrolled). 
273. Department of the Treasury rules exclude coverage under 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(IV) and (a)(10)(A)(ii)(IX) from the definition of minimum essential coverage. 
78 Fed. Reg. at 53,658. The rules would appropriately permit a pregnant woman receiving 
coverage under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(IV) and (a)(10)(A)(ii)(IX) to take advantage of 
APTCs to purchase comprehensive health care coverage through a Marketplace, if she so desired. 
274. NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 72, at 2. 
275. See CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., MEDI-CAL AT CROSSROADS: WHAT ENROLLEES SAY 
ABOUT THE PROGRAM  15 (2012), available at http://www.chcf.org/publications/2012/05/ 
medical-crossroads-what-enrollees-say (examining self-reported data from Medi-Cal beneficiaries 
showing increased difficulty compared to those with private insurance in obtaining out-patient 
appointments with primary care physicians and specialists). 
276. Id. at 11, 15. 42% of those enrolled in Medi-Cal reported difficulty obtaining an 
appointment with a specialist, compared to 24% of those reporting difficulty who have other 
coverage.  Id.  Additionally, 26% of Medi-Cal enrollees reported similar difficulty seeing a 
primary care provider, as compared to 15% of those reporting difficulty who have other coverage.  
Id. 
277. See ANDREW B. BINDMAN ET AL., PHYSICIAN PARTICIPATION IN MEDI-CAL, 2008, CAL. 
HEALTHCARE FOUND. 10 (July 2010), available at http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA% 
20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/P/PDF%20PhysicianParticipationMediCal2008.pdf (explaining that 
the Health Resources and Services Administration established that Medicaid programs should 
provide 60-80 primary care providers per 100,000 Medicaid beneficiaries). 
278. Id. 
279. See Patricia A. Post, Casualties of Complexity: Why Eligible Homeless People Are Not 
Enrolled in Medicaid, NAT’L HEALTH CARE FOR THE HOMELESS COUNCIL 4 (May 2001), 
http://www.nhchc.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Casualties-of-Complexity.pdf (“The great 
irony is that in many states, the Medicaid program has become so fragmented and elaborate that 
many of the people for whom it was intended . . . are unable to negotiate the application and 
enrollment process”).  
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 Physician acceptance of new Medicaid patients also correlates with the 
existence of an infrastructure necessary to process claims paperwork.280  In 
Missouri, for example, perceived administrative burdens associated with Medicaid 
participation are particularly acutely felt among sole or small group practices.281  It 
may be the culture of “deny first” combined with the low reimbursement rate that 
turns providers away from Medicaid participation.282   
 Lack of health care access is a particularly pronounced problem in rural 
settings.  And the smaller scale of health care delivery makes Medicaid 
participation more difficult both for providers and beneficiaries.  Rural Missouri 
residents are poorer than metropolitan residents.283  And rural physicians in 
Missouri are both older than metropolitan physicians284 and practice in smaller 
group settings.285  Rural Missouri residents are also disproportionately represented 
among the uninsured and the low income uninsured.286  Nowhere more than in 
Missouri’s rural areas, do the great demographic forces of modern American health 
care collide: individuals with lower income and worse health status experience a 
shortage of providers in general and providers, in particular, who are equipped to 
accept Medicaid on the scale contemplated by the Medicaid expansion provisions 
of the ACA.287 
 Perhaps the strongest demonstration of this irony is found in the ACA’s 
determination to compensate Medicaid participating primary care providers at a 
higher rate at Medicare parity in 2013 and 2014—instead of at the more typical 
percentage of Medicare.288  Federalizing primary care provider compensation under 
Medicaid, even if only for a two year trial period, provides an opportunity to test 
 
280. See MO. FOUND. FOR HEALTH AND THE HEALTH CARE FOUND. OF GREATER KAN. CITY 
, supra note 115, at 7 (explaining that larger practice settings are more likely to accept Medicaid 
patient because they can see larger volumes of patients which helps offset the lower 
reimbursement rates and claims paper work). 
281. See id. at 7 (explaining that sole or small group physicians operate on small margins and 
the administrative burden of Medicaid may be a disincentive). 
282. See id. (explaining that some states have fee-for-service systems that require the 
Medicaid program to “deny first” when processing claims).  
283. See MO. HOSP. ASS’N, PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS: THE STATUS IN RURAL MISSOURI 1 
(2011), available at http://www.missourihealthmatters.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/ 
072711_Physician-Workforce-Report.pdf (noting that approximately 5% more rural residents than 
metropolitan residents in Missouri live in poverty). 
284. See id. at 4 (“In Missouri, 55 percent of all physicians are 50 or older.  Yet, the 
percentage of rural physicians 50 and older jumps to 62 percent.”). 
285. Id. (explaining that the ratio of primary care physicians to residents is much lower in 
rural Missouri than in the state’s metropolitan areas). 
286. See KEITH J. MUELLER ET AL., MEDICAID AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO RURAL HEALTH 4 
(2007), available at http://www.rupri.org/Forms/IssueBrief.pdf (describing the economic benefits 
of Medicaid in rural America, including sustaining rural primary care practices in areas 
disproportionately populated by people without health insurance). 
287. See MO. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 282, at 4, 7 (explaining that rural Missouri has fewer 
primary care physicians per citizen than metropolitan Missouri, and that, for example, a lack of 
specialists strains primary care physicians’ ability to take on new Medicaid patients). 
288. 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(13)(C) (Supp. V 2006). 
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whether primary care providers shirk Medicaid beneficiaries solely because of 
Medicaid reimbursement concerns or because of other related and un-related 
concerns.  
E. Does Medicaid Coverage Improve Health Outcomes? 
 The contention that Medicaid expansion may actually reduce access to health 
care relies on data indicating better health outcomes for those without insurance or 
those with commercial insurance.289  The implication is that more doctors are 
willing to see the uninsured rather than the Medicaid insured because seeing the 
latter will force them to “go broke.”290  In fact, this is true because some of the 
uninsured pay out of pocket.291  Not only do providers not “go broke” seeing these 
individuals, they may well represent the single highest paying group in any 
particular payer mix.292  While correct in the pronouncement that “health insurance 
is not the same thing as health care”293 the analysis is incomplete in failing to 
estimate whether better Medicaid reimbursement vis-à-vis commercial insurance 
might not be the root cause and for the assumption that it cannot be remedied.  
 Increased Medicaid reimbursement rates should not be so far beyond health 
care organization ken—despite their presence in the ACA itself—that they are not 
even considered. 
1. Does Health Insurance From Any Source Improve Health Status? 
 The downside to health insurance expansion has long been acknowledged as 
the problem of moral hazard.294  The same health insurance expansion that 
generally makes health insurance cheaper may also promote over-consumption of 
 
289. Roy, supra note 256 (describing studies showing that Medicaid patients have worse 
health outcomes than patients with private insurance and no insurance). 
290. See id. (explaining Medicaid reimburses doctors below the cost of treating Medicaid 
patients).  
291. See id. (explaining that many uninsured individuals pay for health care out of pocket).  
Seen from this perspective, “uninsured” is an umbrella term for disparate groups: the voluntarily 
uninsured, the involuntarily uninsured, those able to pay out of pocket for health care services, and 
those unable to do so.  See JUNE E. O’NEILL & DAVE M. O’NIELL, EMP’T POLICIES INST., WHO 
ARE THE UNINSURED?: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICA’S UNINSURED POPULATION, THEIR 
CHARACTERISTICS AND THEIR HEALTH 5, 20 (2009) available at 
http://www.epionline.org/studies/oneill_06-2009.pdf (defining voluntarily uninsured, 
involuntarily uninsured, those able to pay out of pocket for health care services, and those unable 
to pay for health care services). 
292. See Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us, TIME (Mar. 4, 2013) 
(explaining that hospitals set their rates at “chargemaster” prices, marked up as much as over one 
hundred times the actual cost, and discount that initial rate for private and public insurers, but not 
for the uninsured who end up paying more). 
293. See Roy, supra note 256. 
294. See Katherine Baicker, et al., Behavioral Hazard in Health Insurance 2 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18468, 2012), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18468.pdf (stating that subsidizing health care creates the moral 
hazard of overutilization). 
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health care services.295  Health insurance, seen from this perspective, may promote 
inefficient overuse if it functions to lower cost to the consumer to the point of total 
or near total insulation from the price to insurer or the cost of production of health 
care by providers.296   
 There has been some research documenting that health care consumers are 
price sensitive, and that this price sensitivity drives some overuse of health care.297  
And there has been some research documenting consumer price sensitivity driven 
underutilization of health benefits.298  These are also characterized as inefficiencies 
because such underutilization is often of some of the most cost effective 
interventions in health care—things like failing to uniformly and consistently use 
beta blockers to fight heart disease.299 
 Even as this article goes to press, a new study on the relationship between the 
Massachusetts state specific health care reform’s expansion of insurance and  its 
same period mortality data reignites the debate about whether the Massachusetts 
decline in mortality by three percent percentage points in the first four years of 
reform can tell us anything about the implications of improved access elsewhere in 
the United States.300  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 The Medicaid expansion that emerged from the Supreme Court, tempered by 
the implementation-altered optional Medicaid expansion going on all around us 
certainly demonstrates that Medicaid expansion itself may not survive National 
Federation.  But pre-ACA expansion appears to be intact.  No state, however 
ambivalent about the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid, is proposing to throw in the 
towel on Medicaid altogether.301  If the re-invention of expanded Medicaid is 
allowed to bleed over into using pre-expansion Medicaid as a funding 
mechanism—creating another class of Medicaid distinct from pre-expansion 
Medicaid—it may be that Medicaid as we know it today, in non-Bridge to 
 
295. See id. (“[S]ubsidizing health care causes people to use too much of it.”). 
296. See id. (stating that overutilization of health care results from pricing it below cost). 
297. See RAND HEALTH, THE HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT: A CLASSIC RAND STUDY 
SPEAKS TO THE CURRENT HEALTH CARE REFORM DEBATE 2 (2006), available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2006/RAND_RB9174.pdf 
(explaining that patients without cost sharing obligations tend to use more health care services 
than those with cost sharing).  
298. See Baicker et al., supra note 293, at 2 (describing the inefficiency of underusing highly 
beneficial health care). 
299. See id. (explaining that people often underuse such cost-effective interventions as beta 
blockers, HIV drugs, antibiotics for tuberculosis, Medicaid-covered prenatal care, and post-organ 
transplant immunosuppressants). 
300. Benjamin D. Sommers et al, Changes in Mortality After Massachusetts Health Care 
Reform: A Quasi-Experimental Study, 160  ANN. INTERNAL MED. 585, 593 (2014). 
301. See Medicaid, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
issues-research/health/medicaid-home-page.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2013) (stating that every 
state in the United States continues to participate in pre-ACA Medicaid). 
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Expansion states, will fail.302  Further polarizing the interests of the core Medicaid 
beneficiaries or the poor from the interests of the re-invented expansion Medicaid 
beneficiaries or the working poor may end any effort to bring Medicaid into the 
mainstream.303  
 In summary, the complex evolution of Medicaid going forward, framed as 
one big Medicaid gamble, produced an almost infinite number of side bets that 
distort our view of the original.304  The future of Medicaid—almost Byzantine in its 
current complexity—is destined to be even more multiple and varied.305  The 
original gamble that Medicaid would be federalized devolved into a situation where 
individual stakeholders will build their own Medicaid programs even more tailored 
to their hopes and fears.306 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
302. See supra Parts III.C.1, IV.A.1 (describing the legal contentiousness and potential 
unsustainability of maintaining low Medicaid reimbursement rates for Medicaid expansion as well 
as the high cost of funding “Medicaid-like” programs). 
303. See supra Part IV.A (explaining that the fundamental social and economic ambivalence 
toward the poor in the United States produces public resistance to Medicaid itself).  
304. See supra Part I (describing the many kinds and instances of gambles underlying 
Medicaid reform that manifest ACA implementation as a splintered and complicated mess rather 
than the unified expansion of Medicaid envisioned by the ACA’s framers). 
305. See supra text accompanying notes 192–94 (describing the increased complexity and 
confusion that will result when states implement their varied Medicaid expansion plans).  
306. See supra pp. 57–59. 
